Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 16, Issue 2

1992

Article 4

The Court of First Instance: The First Three
Years
Marc van der Woude∗

∗

Copyright c 1992 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

The Court of First Instance: The First Three
Years
Marc van der Woude

Abstract
This Article examines the way the CFI has exercised its jurisdiction in the category of cases
concerning EC competition matters, from the beginning of its activities until June 30, 1992. The
first three sections of this Article are of an institutional nature. They deal respectively with the
definition of the CFI’s competence, its working methods as specified by its new Rules of Procedure, and its productivity in comparison to that of the Court of Justice. The fourth section gives a
survey of some selected issues of its jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 1988, the Council of the European Communities (the "Council") decided to establish a Court of First
Instance (the "CFI"),' as foreseen by Article 168a of the
* A version of this Article will be published in 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
(Barry E. Hawk ed., 1993). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1993.
** Official, Commission of the European Communities. All views expressed are
purely personal. The author would like to thank Elizabeth Willocks and Bernard
Geneste for their numerous and useful comments.
1. Council Decision No. 88/591, O.J. L 319/1 (1988), amended by O.J. C 215/1
(1989) [hereinafter CFI Statute]. For further reading on the Court of First Instance
("CFI"), see TIMOTHY MILLET, THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (1990); R. Joliet & W. Vogel, Le Tribunal de premiere instance des Communautis europiennes, 329 REVUE DU MARCHf COMMUN 423 (1989); Ole Due, The Court
of First Instance, Y.B. EUR. L. 1 (1988); Jacques Biancarelli, La criation du Tribunal de
premire instance des Communautis europiennes: un luxe ou une necessiti?, 26 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPtEN 1 (1990); K. Lenaerts, Het Gerecht van eerste aanleg van de

EG, 38

SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING

INSTANCE DES COMMUNAUTfS

EUROPtENNES
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527 (1990); LE TRIBUNAL
(Spyros Pappas ed. 1990).

DE PREMIIRE

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

413

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"EEC Treaty"). 2 The Council considered that the establishment of this court would not only improve the judicial protection of individual interests with respect to actions requiring
close examination of complex facts, but that it would also alleviate the workload of the European Court of Justice (the
"Court ofJustice"). 3 The Council therefore transferred to the
CFI the jurisdiction to hear and determine, at first instance,
certain classes of actions which frequently require an examination of complex facts including staff cases, certain coal and
steel cases, and actions brought by natural and legal persons in
EC competition matters.4
This Article examines the way the CFI has exercised its
jurisdiction in the category of cases concerning EC competition matters, from the beginning of its activities until June 30,
1992. The first three sections of this Article are of an institutional nature. They deal respectively with the definition of the
CFI's competence, its working methods as specified by its new
Rules of Procedure, and its productivity in comparison to that
of the Court of Justice. The fourth section gives a survey of
some selected issues of its jurisprudence. The nature of the
CFI's judicial control is the theme of the last section. The final
remarks concern the question of whether the CFI's activities
have lived up to the Council's expectations. These remarks
serve as conclusions of this descriptive, rather than analytical,
Article.
I. COMPETENCE OF THE CFI
According to Article 168a of the EEC Treaty, the Council
may give the CFI jurisdiction to decide certain classes of actions or proceedings brought by natural or legal persons, sub-'
ject to the right of appeal to the Court of Justice on questions
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958), amended by Single
European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [treaty as amended referred to hereinafter as EEC Treaty].
3. CFI Statute, supra note 1, O.J. L 319/1, at 1 (1988); seeA European Court of First
Instance, SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 5TH REP., 1987-88
Sess., H.L. (Eng.) (stating facts and figures of workload reduction).

4. CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 3,

OJ. L 319/1,

at 2 (1988).
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of law alone.5 On October 24, 1988, the Council specified this
jurisdiction.6 Article 3(1)(c) of Council Decision No. 88/591
(the "CFI Statute") provides that the CFI shall be competeht
to decide actions brought against an institution of the Communities by natural or legal persons pursuant to Articles 173(2)
and 175(3) of the EEC Treaty relating to the implementation
of the competition rules applicable to undertakings. 7 The CFI
also has jurisdiction to determine actions for compensation for
damages caused by a Community institution by an act or by a
failure to act which is subject to an action under Articles 173
and 175 of the EEC Treaty.'
The Council's definition of the CFI's jurisdiction raises
several problems. First, what is meant by "competition rules
applicable to undertakings?" Does this mean Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty only or other rules as well? Second, undertakings maybe confused because of the vague definition of
the CFI's jurisdiction and file their applications with the wrong
court. Do such errors have consequences for the admissibility
of applications and, in particular, for the calculation of the
time limits of Articles 173(2) and 175(3)? Third, Article 168a
of the EEC Treaty specifically rules out the CFI's competence
to decide actions brought by Member States or Community institutions and questions referred for a preliminary ruling
under Article 177. 9 This means that both the CFI and the
Court ofJustice can be seised of cases in which the same relief
is sought, the same issue of interpretation is raised, or the validity of the same act is called into question, at the same time.
These problems were foreseen by the Council. Article 7
of the CFI Statute inserted certain mechanisms in the Protocol
on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community (the "ECJ Protocol").' 0 Article 47(1) of the
ECJ Protocol ensures that applications lodged with the regis5. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 168a.
6. CFI Statute, supra note 1, OJ. L 319/1 (1988):
7. Id. art. 3(1)(c), OJ. L 319/1, at 2 (1988).
8. Id. art. 3(2), OJ. L 319/1, at 2 (1988).
9. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 168a.
10. CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 7, OJ. L 319/1, at 4-6 (1988) (amending Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community
[hereinafter ECJ Protocol]).
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trar of the wrong court do not lead to admissibility problems."
It provides that applications lodged by mistake be automati2
cally transferred from one registrar to the other.'
Article 47(2) of the ECJ Protocol concerns the division of
jurisdiction between the CFI and the Court ofJustice.' 3 If one
court finds that it is not competent' it shall refer the action to
the other court. 14 The Court of Justice, however, has the'final
say. Once a case has been transferred from the Court of Justice to the CFI, the latter may not decline jurisdiction.' 5 It
should be noted that this system only deals with negative conflicts of jurisdiction. If the CFI determines that it has jurisdiction and that it will decide the case, the only means to contest
its competence is an appeal to the Court of Justice. This appeal need not necessarily be brought against the final judgment of the CFI. Article 114 of the CFI's Rules of Procedure
allows parties to apply for a separate decision on the CFI's
competence. 16 This decision does not go to the substance of
the case and it can be challenged in an appeal before the Court
of Justice. During the procedure before the Court of Justice,
the CFI may stay its proceedings pursuant to Article 77 of its
7
Rules of Procedure.'
The third paragraph of Article 47 of the ECJ Protocol
deals with the concurrent jurisdiction of both courts.' 8 This
situation may occur when a Member State challenges the same
decision as an undertaking or when an action before the CFI
raises the same issue as a request for a preliminary ruling.' 9 In
such cases the CFI may, after hearing the parties, stay the pro11. See id. art. 7,

OJ. L 319/1, at 4-5 (1988) (amending ECJ Protocol, supra note

10).
12. Id. The system has been applied in staff cases. See, e.g., TAO/AFI v. Commission, Case C-322/91 (pending before the Court of Justice).
13. See CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 7, O.J. L 319/1, at 5 (1988) (amending ECJ
Protocol, supra note 10).
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Court of First Instance, Rules of Procedure, art. 114, O.J. L 136/1, at 20
(1991) [hereinafter CFI Rules of Procedure].
17. Id. art. 77(b), O.J. L 136/1, at 15 (1991).
18. See CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 7, OJ. L 319/1, at 5 (1988) (amending ECJ
Protocol, supra note 10).
19. Member States may have an interest in challenging decisions addressed to
undertakings. See Italy v. Commission, Case 41/83, [1985] E.C.R. 873, [1985] 2
C.M.L.R. 368.
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ceedings until the Court of Justice has delivered its judgment.20 Where applications are made for the same act to be
declared void, the CFI may also decline jurisdiction in favor of
the Court of Justice. 2 ' Conversely, Article 47(3) of the ECJ
Protocol enables the Court ofJustice to stay its proceedings; in
that event the proceedings before the CFI continue.2 2
The system foreseen by Article 47 of the ECJ Protocol has
been applied on three occasions. The first case concerned an
application before the Court of Justice lodged by Asia Motor
France against the Commission.2 3 In that case, the Court of
Justice held that the Commission had failed to initiate Article
169 proceedings against France for infringing Article 30.24
The Court of Justice also stated that the Commission had
failed to act under Article 85 against a cartel of French importers of Japanese motor vehicles. In its order of May 23, 1990,
the Court of Justice ruled that the first plea was manifestly
inadmissible and that the second concerned the implementation of competition rules applicable to undertakings.2 5 The
case was therefore transferred to the CFI, pursuant to Article
47(2) of the ECJ Protocol.2 6
The second case was more complicated. It started with
two actions for annulment brought before the Court ofJustice,
one by the Dutch government 2 7 and the other by the official
Dutch mail company, 28 against a decision adopted by the Commission under Article 90(3) and addressed to the Dutch government. 9 On June 4, 1991, the Court of Justice decided,
under Article 47(2) of the ECJ Protocol, to refer Dutch Mail to
20. CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 7,

O.J.

L 319/1, at 5 (1988) (amending ECJ

Protocol, supra note 10).
21. Id.
22. See id. art. 5, O.J. L 319/1, at 3 (1988) (amending ECJ Protocol, supra note
10).
23. See Asia Motor France v. Commission, Case C-72/90, [1990] E.C.R. 2181.
24. Id. at 2185.
25. Id. at 2185-86. It is standing case law that, pursuant to Article 175, private
individuals cannot compel the Commission to act under Article 169. See Emrich v.
Commission, Case C-371/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1555.
26. Asia Motor France, [1990] E.C.R. at 2186.
27. Re Courier Services: Netherlands v. Commission, Case C-48/90 (Eur. Ct.J.
Feb. 1992) (not yet reported).
28. Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV and PTT Post BV v. Commission, Case C66/90, [1991] E.C.R. 2723 [hereinafter Dutch Mail].
29. Dutch Express Delivery, O.J. L 10/47 (1989).
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the CFI. The Dutch Mail case concerned an action brought
against an institution of the Communities by a legal person
pursuant to Article 173(2) that related to the implementation
of competition rules applicable to undertakings which are foreseen by the first section of Chapter 1, Title I of Part III (Articles 85-90) of the EEC Treaty.30 In its order, the Court ofJustice also applied Article 47(3), of the ECJ Protocol. The Court
of Justice decided not to suspend the proceedings in case C48/90. l
The CFI understood that the Court of Justice wanted to
clear the issue raised by the Dutch government and, after hearing the parties, declined jurisdiction in order to allow the
Court of Justice to rule on both cases that concern the same
act. In its order of June 21, 1991 the CFI explained why it
declined jurisdiction. 32 It specified that a simple stay of proceedings would affect the right of the parties to make their observations known in due time." This is because Article 37 of
the ECJ Protocol does not allow private parties to intervene in
cases between Member States and Community institutions.3 4
The last case again concerned the importation ofJapanese
cars into France. Sofacar, a French parallel importer, lodged
two complaints with the Commission's services, one with DGIII based upon Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and the other with
DG-IV based upon Article 90 of the EEC Treaty.35 After the
Commission failed to define its position, Sofacar initiated an
Article 175 proceeding before the CFI against the Commission's failure to act. The Commission applied by a separate
document for a decision on the admissibility of the action and
on the competence of the CFI.36 It argued that Articles 30 and
30. Dutch Mail, [1991] E.C.R. 2723.
31. See Re Courier Services: Netherlands v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. 2723.

32. Koninklijke PTT Nederland NV and PTT Post BV v. Commission, Case T42/91, [1991] E.C.R. 11-274 (Ct. First Instance).
33. Id.
34. See id.

35. Sofacar sarl v. Commission, Case T-27/91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 31, 1992)
(not yet reported). The complaint raised an interesting issue: Can the Commission
grant interim relief under Article 90(3) of the EEC Treaty?
36. The Commission's application was lodged pursuant to Article 91 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice that applied mutatis mutandis to the procedure before the CFI until the adoption of its own rules of procedures that came into
force on July 1, 1991. The application is dated May 30, 1991, five days before the
Court of Justice's order in Dutch Mail, Case C-66/90, [1991] E.C.R. 2723.
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90(1) of the EEC Treaty concern the behavior of Member
States. The CFI did not accept these arguments. It observed
that Sofacar's action did not relate to Article 30. As regards
Article 90, the CFI simply referred to the decision of the Court
of Justice of June 4, 1991 in Dutch Mail. Sofacar's action,
therefore, fell within the jurisdiction of the CFI.
In light of this case law, it can be said that all actions
brought by private parties under Articles 173 and 175 and relating to the provisions of Part III, Title I, Chapter I, section 1
of the EEC Treaty (Articles 85-90) belong to the jurisdiction of
the CFI. This criterion is simple and formalistic. The fact that
Article 90 belongs to the section with the title "Rules applying
to undertakings ' 37 does not mean that it actually regulates the
conduct of undertakings. On the contrary, in France v. Commission, the Court of Justice specifically held that this provision
only related to the behavior of Member States and that private
conduct should be assessed under Articles 85 and 86.38 Moreover, the rigid application of the Court of Justice's formalistic
criterion may lead to the strange result that competition cases
which are not based on provisions of section 1 fall outside the
scope of the CFI's jurisdiction, even if they directly concern
the conduct of undertakings. This situation may occur in actions Kelated to the application of the regulation on merger
control.3 9 It is highly improbable, however, that the Court of
Justice would deny the jurisdiction of the CFI in merger
cases. 40 This is because the CFI's competence is in the process
of being enlarged.
'Article 3(3) of the CFI Statute provides, in this respect,
that the Council will, in the light of experience, including the
development of jurisprudence, and after two years of operation of the CFI, reexamine the Court ofJustice's initial proposal' to give the CFI competence to exercise jurisdiction in
dumping cases. 4 On October 17, 1991, the Court of Justice
submitted a new proposal to the President of the Council
37. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 90.
38. France v. Commission, Case C-202/88, [1991] E.C.R. 1223, 55.
39. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), correctedversion in O.J.
L 257/13 (1990).
40. In the meantime, the CFI's jurisdiction is confirmed. See Perrier Employees
v. Commission, Case T-96/92R (Ct. First Instance Dec. 15, 1992) (not yet reported).
41. CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 3(3), O.J. L 319/1, at 2 (1988).
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which envisages giving the CFI jurisdiction in all cases brought
by private parties against an institution of the Communities
pursuant to Articles 173, 175, and 178 of the EEC Treaty.
Although the Council has not yet defined its position, the
Court ofJustice's proposal is likely to be accepted. The Member States have decided, in the context of the Maastricht conference, to revise Article 168a. The new version of this article
excludes from the CFI's competence preliminary proceedings
under Article 177 only.42 This means that the Council may
give the CFI competence not only in all actions brought by individuals against Community institutions, but also in actions
against Member States and institutions.
43
II. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CF1

The CFI has a president and eleven other members who
sit in chambers of three or five judges. 4 4 Staff cases are assigned to chambers of three. 45 All other cases are, in principle,
assigned to chambers of five, i.e., the first and the second
chambers. 46 Article 14 of the Rules of Procedure provides that
a case may also be referred to the CFI sitting in plenary session
or to a chamber composed of a different number of judges
whenever the legal difficulty, the importance of the case, or
special circumstances so justify.47 The CFI has applied Article
14 in Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission.4 8
42. The Registrar of the CFI believes that the CFI's competence should also
extend to preliminary rulings. See H. Jung, Funktion, Arbeitsweise und Zukunft des Gerichts Erster Instanz der Europdischen Gemeinschaften, ZENTRUM FOR EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 17-21 (1992). Mr. Jung foresees already that this overall competence
of the CFI would increase its workload and that the number of members of the CFI
would eventually be increased. All organizations have an inherent tendency to grow,
even those that were intended to alleviate the burden of other organizations. For a
more moderate assessment of the CFI's future role, see Reflections on the Future Development of the Community Judicial System by the CFI itself in 1991 EUR. L. REv. 175.
43. For a detailed description of the CFI's rules of procedure, see Jacques
Biancarelli, Le rglement de procidure du Tribunal de premire instance des Communautis
europiennes: le perfectionnement dans la continuit6, 27 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT
EUROPkEN 543 (1991).
44. CFI Statute, supra note 1, art. 2, OJ. L 319/1, at 2 (1988).

45. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 12, § 1, OJ. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
46. Id.
47. Id. art. 14, OJ. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
48. Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-309,
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (Ct. First Instance). Article 14 has also been applied in two
recently decided cases: Asia Motor France SA v. Commission, Case T-28/90, [1992]
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When the CFI sits in plenary session, Article 17 of the
Rules of Procedure prescribes that it shall be assisted by an
advocate general designated by the President from among the
members of the CFI. 4 9 This rule ensures the uneven amount
of judges required by Article 32 of the CFI Rules of Procedure.50 According to Article 18 of the CFI Rules of Procedure,

an advocate general may also be designated to assist a chamber
if the legal difficulty or factual complexity of a case so requires. 5 Judges Kirschner, Vesterdorf, and Edward were designated as advocate general in Tetra Pak, Polypropylene, and
Automec II respectively.5 2
As soon as a case comes into the registry of the CFI, the
President assigns it to a chamber and to one of its judges who
will act as rapporteur.53 At the end of the written procedure
the rapporteur must present to all the members of the CFI a
preliminary report which contains recommendations as to
E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance); Automec Sri v. Commission,
Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Automec II].
49. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 17, O.J. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
50. Id. art. 32, O.J. L 136/1, at 7 (1991).
51. Id. art. 18, OJ. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
52. See Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. II309, (19911 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (Ct. First Instance). The Polypropylene cartel cases included several actions against various companies: Re the Polypropylene Cartel: SA
Hercules NV v. Commission, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84
(Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Hercules]; Rh6ne-Poulenc v. Commission, Case T- 1/
89, (Ct. First Instance Oct. 24, 1991) (not yet reported); Petrofina v. Commission,
Case T-2/89, (Ct. First Instance Oct. 24, 1991) (not yet reported); Atochem SA v.
Commission, Case T-3/89, (Ct. First Instance Oct. 24, 1991) (not yet reported);
BASF AG v. Commission, Case T-4/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not yet
reported); Enichem Anic SpA, Case T-6/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17, 1991) (not
yet reported); DSM NV v. Commission, Case T-8/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 17,
1991) (not yet reported); Hills AG v. Commission, Case T-9/89 (Ct. First Instance
Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Hoechst AG v. Commission, Case T-10/89 (Ct.
First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Shell Int'l Chemical Co. v. Commission, Case T-I 1/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) [hereinafter
Shell]; Solvay et Cie SA v. Commission, Case T-12/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10,
1992) (not yet reported); Imperial Chemical Indus. PLC v. Commission, Case T-13/
89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) [hereinafter ICI]; Montedipe
SpA v. Commission, Case T-14/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Chemie Linz AG v. Commission, Case T-15/89 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10,
1992) (not yet reported). Automec II and Asia Motor France were joined in the
March 10, 1992 opinion of Advocate General Edward. See Opinion of Advocate General Edward, Automec II and Asia Motor France, [1992] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R.
at 438.
53. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 13, O.J. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
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whether measures of organization of procedure or measures of
inquiry should be undertaken and whether the case should be
referred to the CFI in plenary session or to a chamber with a
different number of judges.54 The CFI seems to attach more
importance to preliminary reports than the Court of Justice
does. At the Court ofJustice, the reports are primarily considered as a means to brief the members, whereas the reports of
the CFI provide a more detailed description and analysis of the
case.
The organization and function of the hearing is also different at the CFI. During the oral procedure in Polypropylene, Societld Italiano Vetro SpA, FabbricaPisana SpA, and PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v. Commission ("Flat Glass"), and Re the PVC Cartel.
BASF AG v. Commission ("PVC"), the CFI pursued an active investigation of the case.55 This requires a proper organization
of the procedure. The CFI Rules of Procedure are, in this respect, much more elaborate and flexible than the rules of the
Court ofJustice. Article 64 of the CFI Rules of Procedure provides for measures of organization of procedure which may
consist, in particular, of putting questions to parties, inviting
them to make submissions on certain issues, asking them or
third parties for information on particulars, asking for documents or papers to be produced, or summoning parties to
meetings. 56 These measures normally require the cooperation
of the parties and are decided by the CFI without any formal
order. According to the practice in big cartel cases, the CFI
(the rapporteur, the advocate general and the registrar) organizes an informal meeting where the hearing is prepared.5 7
In Flat Glass, for example, the rapporteur chaired a twoday informal meeting to prepare reports for the hearing, the
content of which could be accepted by each of the parties as a
complete and detailed summary of its position, and a single
54. Id. art. 52, § 1, O.J. L 136/1, at 11 (1991).
55. See, e.g., Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84; Societd Italiano Vetro
SpA, FabbricaPisana SpA, and PPG Vernante PennitaliaSpA v. Commission,Joined Cases T68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter Flat Glass]; Re the PVC Cartel: BASF AG v. Commission, Joined Cases T-79,
84-86, 89, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89, [1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357
(Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter PVC].
56. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 64, § 3, O.J. L 136/1, at 12
(1991).
57. See Jung, supra note 42, at 6-9.
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common file of documents for all the three cases containing all
the documents that they considered important, together with
agreed transcripts and translations where they were required.
The rapporteur also asked the Commission to produce the
documentary evidence on which the CFI relied for the adoption of its decision. As regards the assessment of the relevant
market, the parties agreed to place in the common file all the
statistics needed for an appreciation of the functioning of the
flat-glass markets.
Article 64 can also be used in less complicated cases. In
La Cinq SA v. Commission,58 for example, an informal meeting
Was held with the parties during which the essential issues of
the case were identified. Following this meeting the applicant
waived his right to reply and contributed to speeding up the
written proceedings. This example shows that the CFI can actively influence the course of proceedings. It should be noted
in this respect that Article 64 of the CFI Rules of Procedure
also allows the CFI to facilitate an amicable settlement of proceedings."
Apart from measures of organization of procedure, the
CFI Rules of Procedure provide for measures of inquiry which
correspond to those foreseen by the Rules of Procedure of the
Court of Justice including personal appearance of the parties,
requests for information, oral testimony, the commissioning of
an expert's report, and inspections of the place or thing in
question. 60 The CFI may prescribe, pursuant to Article 49 of
its Rules of Procedure, measures of organization and inquiry at
any stage of the proceedings. 6 t In La Cinq, for example, the
CFI ordered such measures during the written procedure.6 2
58. Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 449 (Ct. First Instance).
59. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 64, § 2, O.J. L 136/1, at 12
(1991).
60. European Court ofJustice, Rules of Procedure, art. 45, § 2, OJ. C 39/1, at
13 (1982) [hereinafter ECJ Rules of Procedure]. The CFI seems to prefer measures
of organization of procedure to measures of inquiry. Mr. John Temple Lang's prediction that the CFI would probably make more use of measures of inquiry has not
yet come true. See John Temple Lang, The Impact of the New Court of First Instance in
EEC Antitrust and Trade Cases, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 579, 587-93 (Barry E.

Hawk ed., 1988).
61. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16,.art. 49, O.J. L 136/1, at 11 (1991).
62. La Cinq, [1992] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 457.
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The Court ofJustice, however, may only do so at the end of the
written procedure.
The way the CFI reaches its decisions differs from the decision-making procedure at the Court ofJustice. The competent chamber of the CFI normally meets immediately after the
hearing in order to decide upon the outcome and the basic reasoning of the future judgment. In cases where an advocate
general has been designated, the CFI follows the same procedure as the Court of Justice: the judges meet only after the
advocate general has read his opinion.6 3
The most striking difference between the CFI and the
Court of Justice is the length and structure of the judgments.
This difference can be explained by the fact that the judgments
of the CFI do not refer to the hearing report. Instead, they
contain a rather exhaustive summary of the facts, the procedure and the arguments of the parties. As regards these arguments, the CFI uses different techniques to deal with the issues
raised by the parties. In most judgments, the CFI identifies the
pleas of the applicant and deals with them after having summarized the arguments of the applicant and the Commission. In
arguments determine the structure of
this way, the pleas and
64
the CFI's reasoning.
This approach is very difficult to follow in big cartel cases
where many legal and factual arguments are intertwined.6 5 In
Polypropylene, the CFI completely restructured and reformulated the numerous arguments. 6 6 It clearly separated the argu63. ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 60, art. 66(3), O.J. C 39/1, at 17 (1982).
Article 5 of the CFI Statute and Article 61 of the CFI Rules of Procedure allow the
Advocate General to deliver his opinion in writing. See CFI Statute, supra note 1, art.
5, O.J. L 319/1, at 3 (1988) and CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 61, OJ. L
136/1, at 12 (1991).
64. See, e.g., Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R.
11-309, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334 (Ct. First Instance); Radio Telefis Eireann ("RTE") v.
Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance) [hereinafter RTE].
65. Because appeal to the Court of Justice is limited to legal arguments, the
distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is important. John Temple
Lang considered that this distinction would influence the way lawyers would present
their case before the CFI. See Temple Lang, supra note 60, at 585. The case law
examined for the purposes of this present paper does not seem to confirm Mr. Temple Lang's prediction.
66. See, e.g., Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84 (Ct.
First Instance).
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ments of fact from the legal issues. Each section deals with an
issue identified by the CFI itself. The section starts with a summary of the contested part of the Commission decision, which
is followed by a presentation of the arguments of the parties
and the CFI's assessment. In this way the judgment reflects
more the structure of the contested decision than that of the
application. In Flat Glass the CFI followed, in some respects, a
similar approach.6 7 The bulk of the judgment, however, is not
directly concerned with the arguments of the parties. The CFI
notes that the applicants contest the findings of facts of the
Commission, but it does not specify which parts of the decision
are challenged and what the exact arguments are. The CFI
subsequently examines whether the evidence submitted to the
common file by the Commission proves to the requisite legal
standard what the decision states. In this way, the CFI checks
whether the Commission correctly fulfilled its duty.
The new technique developed by the CFI in Polypropylene
should be welcomed. It enables a thorough and logical examination of the facts which are normally decisive in cartel cases.
However, the restructuring of arguments together with the
CFI's active role in the preparation of the procedure may have
some undesirable side effects. It may induce the parties to
raise all sorts of arguments at random hoping that the CFI will
reformulate and rearrange them. 68
III. SOME FIGURES
Courts cannot be compared to factories. Their output
cannot be predicted, planned, or measured; each case has its
own characteristics. This makes it very difficult and hazardous
to give a statistical overview ofjudicial activities.6 9 One should
therefore be cautious with the following figures.
67. Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance).
68. The Court of Justice has in the past been relatively tolerant with the Commission as regards the way it presented its cases under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty.
In a series of recent judgments, however, the Court of Justice has changed its attitude. See Commission v. Danemark, Case C-52/90 (Eur. Ct.J. March 31, 1992) (not
yet reported); see also Commission v. Germany, Case C-290/90 (Eur. Ct. J. May 20,
1992) (not yet reported).
69. For the statistical difficulties encountered, see Christopher Harding, Who
Goes to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Litigation Against the European Community, 17 EUR.
L. REV. 105 (1992).
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When the CFI began functioning in 1989 it received 153
cases from the Court of Justice, seventy-five of which concerned competition problems. The latter figure is somewhat
distorted because forty-two applications related to only three
Commission decisions. On June 30, 1992, the CFI had settled
fifty-three competition cases out of a total of 227 cases. It rendered 133 judgments in general and thirty-two on competition
issues. A similar proportion between staff cases and competition cases can be noticed regarding the number of pending
cases: 146 in general in comparison to sixty-five competition
cases. Finally, an overview of the CFI's productivity could not
be complete without mentioning the orders of the President in
interim proceedings: twelve orders in competition cases out of
a total of twenty-three.
Appeals were brought against thirteen judgments on competition issues. The Court of Justice has not yet had the opportunity to rule on these appeals. This does not mean that
the Court of Justice has been inactive in the field of competition. During the period from January 1, 1990 to June 30,
1992, the Court ofJustice removed nineteen competition cases
from its registrar and rendered fourteen judgments (nine preliminary rulings and five rulings under Article 173 of the EEC
Treaty). Dozens of competition cases are still pending.
Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to make a reliable
comparison between the average duration of proceedings in
competition cases before the CFI and the corresponding duration before the Court ofJustice. It took the latter 15.7 months
to settle a competition case in 1990, 20.6 months in 1991 and
18.3 months for the first two quarters of 1992.70 As regards
the length of proceedings before the CFI, cases transferred
from the Court of Justice should be discarded, because the
written procedure in most of these cases was already finished
before their transfer. This leaves only four judgments as the
basis for the calculation of an average length of fourteen
months. However, it is somewhat discouraging to note that
some of the transferred cases have not yet been decided.
70. The disappointing 1991 figures can be explained by the proceedings in
AKZO Chemie v. Commission, Case C-62/86 (Eur. Ct. J. July 3, 1991) (not yet reported).

426 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:412
IV. THE CASE LAW OF THE CFI
A. Cartels
Under EC law, a horizontal agreement, which has as its
object or effect to fix prices and quotas, necessarily restricts
competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty.7" The CFI confirmed this per se approach in
Polypropylene.7 2 An anti-competitive object suffices to trigger
the prohibition of Article 85(1), even if the activities of one of
the parties to the agreement were unable to have any effect on
the market. The relevant question in this respect is not
whether the individual participation of one of the parties was
capable of having such an effect but whether the infringement
in which the party participated could affect the market.
This per se approach does not mean that an analysis of the
relevant market is superfluous. In Flat Glass, the CFI held that
"the appropriate definition of the market in question is a necessary precondition of any judgment concerning allegedly anticompetitive behavior." 7 3 This general statement implies that
both the object and the effect of a potentially restrictive agree74
ment should be assessed in the light of the relevant market.
Such a market analysis is indeed necessary to assess whether
the restriction is appreciable.7 5 It might also be required in
cases like Flat Glass where the qualification of certain evidence
as incriminating depends to a large extent on the characteristics of the relevant market. One may wonder, however, what
the interest of a market analysis is in straightforward cartel
cases in which many transnational companies are involved.7 6
71. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85.
72. See, e.g., Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R.
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84,
314,
270-72; ICI, Case T-13/89, slip op.
290-94 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10,
1992) (not yet reported); Shell, Case T-I 1/89, slip op.
301-05 (Ct. First Instance
Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported).
73. Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. -, -, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302, -,
159 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992).
74. See Soci~t6 Technique Mini6re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65,
[1966] E.C.R. 235, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357.
75. See V6lk v. Etablissements J. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, [1969] E.C.R. 295,
[1969] C.M.L.R. 273.
76. Advocate General Vesterdorf produced an opinion, dated July 10, 1991, in
the Polypropylene cases, listed supra note 52. It has been reproduced with the Hercules
judgment at [1991] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 89 (Ct. First Instance). See Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, [1991 ] E.C.R. at , [1992] 4 C.M.L.R.
at 164-67, § I.D.5.
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The restrictive nature is, in any case, not the most difficult
aspect of cartels. The biggest problem is finding them. The
Commission must prove that companies colluded to fix prices
and/or quotas. This is a heavy burden because the Commission will rarely find a document entitled "cartel" and which
contains all the relevant evidence. Proof of cartels is normally
of a circumstantial nature; several documents have to be combined and interpreted in the context of a given market. This
kind of evidence was at the core of Polypropylene and Flat
Glass.77 In both cases, the CFI examined whether the Commission had proved to the requisite legal standard the existence of
a cartel. It is unclear what this standard exactly implies, especially since the scope of the CFI's control in the two cases
seems to differ.
In Polypropylene, the CFI's factual analysis is limited to the
allegations of the applicants. Within these limits, the control
of the facts is characterized by the presentation of these allegations. The CFI did not follow the order in which the parties
presented their arguments, rather it reordered them in a logical and chronological way:
* did the company concerned have contacts with its competitors?
" did it attend the meetings?
* to what extent did it participate in the decisions taken at
78
these meetings?
This approach makes sense from a judicial policy point of
view. If the answer to the first question is negative, the court
does not have to reply to the following question. Moreover,
the facts which are held to be conclusive under one question
can be used as the basis for assessing the allegations under the
following question. For example, if it is established that manager X of company A was present at all meetings, his presence
77. See, e.g., Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. -, -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84,
267-306, 47 58-232 (reporting findings of fact); ICI, Case T-13/89, slip op. $$ 48225 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (same); Shell, Case T-I 1/89,
slip op. 74 71-290 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported) (same); Flat
Glass, [1992] E.C,R. at

__,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

__,

$$ 172-313 (same).

78. See, e.g., Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 267-306, 74 58232 (reporting findings of fact); ICI, slip op. $$ 48-225 (same)- Shell, slip op. $$ 71290 (same).
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may be considered as a serious indication that company A actually participated in the decisions taken at those meetings.
The Polypropylene judgments do not clearly reveal upon
whom, the applicant or the Commission, the burden of proof
rests. It seems that this burden shifts according to the different stages of the CFI's analysis. 7 9 The Commission's findings
should, in the first place, rely on sufficient evidence. If this is
established, the applicant should prove that this evidence is
not correct. The difficulty in putting forward this proof depends upon the issue involved and the stage of the Court of
Justice's analysis at which this issue arises. This is because the
evidence produced for a certain finding may often be considered as a presumption for the subsequent issue.
Following this way of reasoning, the CFI found that the
Commission had, in the majority of cases, established to the
requisite legal standard that the applicants had been a party to
a whole complex of schemes, arrangements, and measures decided in the framework of a system of regular meetings and
continuous contact during the years 1977 to 1983. The participation of some companies during certain times within the reference period was, however, not sufficiently proven.
In Flat Glass, the CFI proceeded in a different way. 80 During preparatory meetings the parties agreed on a common file
of documents in light of which the CFI examined the evidence
put forward by the Commission. 8 ' In doing so, the CFI followed the order of the contested decision without referring
formally to the allegations of the applicants. The CFI did not
hesitate to put the evidence in a different context 82 and to give
a new interpretation of the facts in light of the relevant market.8 3 On several issues, the CFI concluded that the evidence
of the Commission was simply lacking, 84 that it only gave a partial or inaccurate account of the facts,8" or that it was not cor79. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 287, 145.
80. See Flat Glass, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302.
81. Id. During its inquiry, the CFI noticed that when the Commission prepared
the documentary evidence with a view to communication to the undertakings, certain
relevant passages were deliberately deleted or omitted, even though they did not
relate to business' secrets. Id. at _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at _,
91.
82. Id. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at ,
219, 224-25.
83. Id. at

-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

,

84. Id. at

-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

,

85. Id. at

-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

-,

200-01, 222.

271.
193.
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rectly interpreted. 6 In paragraph 205, the CFI explicitly criticized the Commission for applying the technique of "cutting
and pasting" evidence collected from unclear sources.8 7
In Flat Glass, the burden of proof seemed to rest entirely
upon the Commission. During its reinvestigation of the case,
the CFI required the Commission to present convincing evidence for the factual allegations in its decision. The Commission failed in this respect. The CFI concluded that one of the
companies had not participated at all in the cartel scheme and
that the participation of the other two companies was limited
both in time and in substance.
The next step to make in cartel cases is the legal qualification of the evidence. In Flat Glass, the Commission based its
decision on the hypothesis that there was a close cartel among
the three members of a national oligopoly. 8 As seen above,
the CFI found that this hypothesis was not correct. The question therefore arose whether the CFI should carry out a new
legal assessment. It held in this-respect that
although a Community court may, as part of the judicial review of the acts of the Community administration, partially
annul a Commission decision ....

that does not mean that it

has jurisdiction to remake the contested decision. The assumption of such jurisdiction could disturb the inter-institutional balance established by the [EEC] Treaty and would
risk prejudicing the rights of defence [of the undertakings
involved].S8

In light of these considerations, the CFI examined
whether after the partial annulment of the contested decision
the scope of the operative part of the decision could be limited
ratione materiae, ratione personae or ratione temporis.9 ° This new
qualification was subject to the condition that the remaining
parts of the decision contained an adequate assessment of the
market and that the companies concerned had had the opportunity to effectively reply to the newly defined objections. 9
In Polypropylene the qualification issue was of a different na86. Id. at
87. Id. at
88. Id. at
89. Id. at
90. Id. at

91. Id.

-,
-,

-,
-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

222.
$, 205.

-,

,[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

,

314.

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

,

319.
$, 320.
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ture. It concerned the question whether the collusion between
the manufacturers should be qualified as an agreement or as a
concerted practice. The Commission had qualified the whole
complex of schemes and arrangements decided on in the context of regular and institutionalized meetings as a single continuing agreement. More detailed sub-agreements, which
were sometimes of an implied nature, implemented this
scheme. The Commission decided in this respect that it did
not matter whether the concrete implementation by certain
producers displayed more of the characteristics of a concerted
practice than those of an agreement. The importance of the
concept of concerted practice did not result so much from the
distinction between the different forms of collusion falling
under Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty as from the distinction
between collusion in general and mere parallel behavior with
no element of concertation.
Most applicants argued that they had not participated in
any agreement because they had not expressed their consent
to be bound. They also argued that in order for companies to
participate in a concerted practice, they should have mutual
expectations as regards their behavior. Moreover, a practice
could only exist if these concerted expectations effectively led
to the envisaged conduct in the market. Rhdne Poulenc v. Commission specified, in this respect, that the concept of concerted
practice had two constituent elements, conspiracy and conduct.9 2 Mere conspiracy with the object to restrict competition
could therefore not be caught under Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty.
The CFI's answer to these arguments was primarily of a
factual nature. It held in the first place that the Commission
had proved to the requisite legal standard that the companies
concerned had expressed their joint intention to conduct
themselves in the market in a specific way.9 3 The existence of
an agreement was therefore properly established.
The CFI also ruled that the measures for the concrete implementation of the scheme could be qualified as a concerted
92. Rh6ne Poulenc v. Commission, Case T-1/89 (Ct. First Instance Oct. 24,
1991) (not yet reported).
93. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at , [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 311,
256; IC!, slip op.
253; Shell, slip op. 299.
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practice in light of the conditions defined by the Court of Justice in Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission. 9
The CFI rejected the argument that this concept required actual conduct on the market. 95 Through their participation in
meetings, the companies concerned took part in concerted action, the purpose of which was to influence their conduct in the
market and to disclose to each other the course of conduct
which each of the producers itself contemplated adopting on
the market.96
However, the CFI specified that, by eliminating in advance
the uncertainty about their future conduct and the determination of their policies on the market, the companies could not
fail to take account, directly or indirectly, of the information
obtained during the course of those meetings.97 This could
mean that every concertation produces its effects on market
conduct, albeit not necessarily those effects which were envisaged at the moment of concertation.
Finally, the CFI examined whether the Commission was
entitled to qualify one infringement as both an agreement and
a concerted practice. 98 In this respect, it repeated that, in view
of their identical purposes, the various concerted practices followed and agreements concluded formed part of systems of
regular meetings, target-price fixing, -and quota-fixing. 99
Those systems were part of a series of efforts made by the undertakings in question in pursuit of a single aim, namely to distort the normal development of prices on the polypropylene
market.100 The CFI held that it would be artificial under these
94. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 311-12, $ 258 (citing
Co6peratieve vereniging 'Suiker Unie' UA v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-48, 50,
54-56, 111 & 114/73, [1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295 (Ct. First Instance);
ICI, slip op. $ 300 (same); Shell, slip op. 9 255 (same).
95. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 311-12, 44 258-60; ICI,
slip op. 4 255-58; Shell, slip op. $$ 300-05.
96. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 311-12, 44 258-60; ICI,
slip op.
255-58; Shell, slip op.
300-05.
97. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 311-12, 4 9258-60; ICI,
slip op. 7 255-58; Shell, slip op. 91 300-05.
98. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 312-13, 91 262-64; ICI,
slip op. 47 259-61; Shell, slip op. $ 304-05.
99. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 312-13, $ 262-64; ICI, slip
op. $9 259-61; Shell, slip op. 4 304-05.
100. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 312-13,
262-64; ICI,
slip op. 91 259-61; Shell, slip op. $$ 304-05.
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circumstances to split up such continuous conduct by treating
it as consisting of a number of separate infringements.' 0 '
Some factual elements could, therefore, be characterized as
agreements and others as concerted practices for the purposes
of Article 85(1), which does not foresee a specific category of
collusion for a complex infringement of this type.
Dansk Pelsdyravlerforening v. Commission ("Danish Furs")'0 2
did not raise the same problems as those analyzed above in the
context of Polypropylene and Flat Glass. It concerned the statutory obligations of the individual members of a Danish
breeder's association. First, the members were not allowed to
contribute to the organization of fur sales which competed
with the sales of the association. Second, the members could
benefit from certain advantages, like advance payments and
risk insurance, if they supplied their production exclusively to
the association. The Commission held that the combined effect of these clauses was the foreclosure of the Danish fur market and fined the association ECU500,000.
The applicant argued that these obligations were inherent
in the structure of a farmer's association, which allows small
family undertakings to survive. Article 85 should therefore not
apply to these obligations. After having observed that furs
were not agricultural products falling within the scope of Regulation 26/62,103 the CFI ruled that the creation of an association did not in itself restrict competition. However, its functioning and, in particular, its fidelity obligations could, in certain markets, have such an effect on both the relations between
members and the relations between members and third parties. The particular obligations of an association did not,
therefore, preclude the application of Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty. The CFI specified, however, that their characteristics
could be assessed under Article 85(3). This specification was
intended to comfort the Danish and Belgian governments who
101. Hercules, [1991] E.C.R.

op.

-,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 312-13,

263; ICI, slip

260; Shell, slip op. 305.
102. Case T-61/89 (Ct. First InstanceJuly 3, 1992) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Danish Furs].
103. Council Regulation No. 26/62, 30 J.O. 993 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 129 (applying certain rules of competition to production of and trade in
agricultural products).
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considered that the legal form of an association should remain
available as a means to run a company.
As regards the non-competition clause imposed on the
Danish fur breeders, the CFI held that such clauses do not necessarily restrict competition. In the present case, however, the
clause did have a restrictive effect because it was disproportionate in light of the objectives pursued by the association and
because it effectively shielded off the Danish market. The CFI
also held that the Commission was entitled to decide that the
exclusive supply obligations were contrary to Article 85(1), because they were not necessary for the operation of the advance
payment and insurance schemes. However, the CFI partially
annulled the decision. It considered that some aspects were
not proved and that others were not properly motivated. The
CFI therefore reduced the fine to ECU300,000.
B. Distribution
In Peugeot v. Commission,'0 4 the CFI had to interpret Regulation 123/85 on selective distribution for motor vehicles, and,
in particular, Article 3(11) which exempts the following obligation: the dealer may only sell vehicles to final consumers using
the services of an intermediary if that intermediary fulfills two
conditions. The intermediary must have prior written authority to purchase a specified model and, as the case may be, to
accept delivery thereof on the final consumer's behalf.'0 5 The
explanatory notice concerning this regulation specifies that the
intermediary must prove that, in buying a vehicle, he is acting
on behalf of and for the account of the customer and that dealers can be obliged not to supply vehicles to or through a third
party who represents himself as an authorized dealer. °6
These two aspects can be contradictory as some resellers may
act on behalf of customers and represent themselves as official
dealers.
In Peugeot, the CFI determined that the commercial freedom of an intermediary prevailed. An intermediary should be
104. Peugeot v. Commission, Case T-23/89 (Ct. First Instance July 12, 1991)
(not yet reported).
105. Id.; Council Regulation No. 123/85, OJ. L 15/16 (1985).
106. Commission Notice Concerning Council Regulation No. 123/85, OJ. C
17/3, at 5 (1985).
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free to buy vehicles from authorized dealers established in one
Member State on behalf of customers in another Member
State, provided that it acts upon their prior written notice. In
this respect, it should be noted that the intermediary involved,
Ecosystem, exercised its activities on a commercial basis and
imported into France 150 vehicles a month. This means that
selective distribution networks for motor vehicles can effectively be undermined through formalistic devices such as an
authorization to act signed by the customer.
The CFI's assessment of the selective distribution network
for parapharmaceutical products in Vichy v. Commission is
equally formalistic.'" 7 The CFI upheld a decision adopted pursuant to Article 15(6) of Regulation 17 in which the Commission considered that access to this network was based upon
quantitative criteria; only official pharmacies could become
resellers of Vichy products and the number of pharmacies was
limited by law in six Member States. According to the CFI, it
was irrelevant whether this restricted access resulted from the
will of Vichy itself or from pre-existing public regulations.
Vichy could not ignore these regulations. The CFI added that
a proper distribution of the products in question did not necessarily require sales in official pharmacies. Such a requirement is disproportionate because the goods can be sold adequately by pharmacists employed by other resellers.' 0 8
Quite surprisingly, the CFI considered that the quantitative and disproportionate nature of the selection criteria did
not suffice to trigger the application of Article 85(1), whereas
the Court of Justice has ruled on several occasions that such
criteria lead to the exclusion of potential resellers and, therefore, restrict competition.' 0 9 Does this attitude of the CFI
mean that the restriction of intra-brand competition resulting
from the criteria may be offset by an increase in inter-brand
competition?
107. Case T-19/91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27, 1992) (not yet reported) [hereinafter Vichy].
108. Proportionality as a means to assess the admissibility of selective distribution under Article 85(1) is new; does it mean that proportionate quantitative criteria
are allowed and that disproportionate qualitative criteria are not?
109. See Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, Case 26/76,
[1977] E.C.R. 1875, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R. 1; SA Binon and Cie v. SA Agence et
messageries de la presse (AMP), Case 298/83, [1985] E.C.R. 2015, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R.
800.
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The answer to this question could be affirmative, if one
notes that the CFI carried out a separate examination of the
restrictive effects of the network in its economic and legal context. However, in assessing these elements the CFI seems not
to be concerned with inter-brand competition, but with the
question of whether the restriction of intra-brand competition
was appreciable.l 0 It held, in this respect, that the deontology
rules weakened competition between official pharmacies and
that promoting competition between these resellers and others
would increase intra-brand competition and erode the price
differences throughout the Community. As regards the reference to the context of the Vichy network, the CFI ruled that
the existence of parallel networks cumulatively restricted competition and that, in light of Vichy's position in the market, this
restriction was appreciable. The CFI did not examine whether
the existence of these networks effectively led to the foreclosure of the market. Such a test was prescribed by the Court of
Justice in Delimitis v. Henninger Brdu AG."' In that judgment
the Court of Justice made it clear that exclusive purchasing
agreements for beer are only caught by Article 85(1) insofar as
they significantly contribute to the foreclosure of the relevant
market and the existence of parallel networks is only one of the
elements which can contribute to this restrictive effect. In light
of these considerations, one may wonder whether the CFI's
Vichy judgment complies with the case law of the Court ofJus2
tice. 11
Finally, the CFI held that the Vichy network did not merit
an exemption, because the improvements of the distribution of
the products in question did not require sales in an official
pharmacy. The same results could be achieved by sales in
other stores employing a pharmacist.
C. Article 86
In Tetra Pak, the CFI had to decide whether a block ex110. Vichy, slip op. 78. In paragraph 78, the CFI even states that the quantitative selection criterion is in itself a restriction of competition. Id.
111. Delimitis v. Henninger Briu AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 935, __
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210, 246- 47.
112. In this respect, it should also be noted that selective distribution agreements are, in principle, less harmful for competition than beer supply agreements
because the former agreements do not tie a single reseller to a specific brand.
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emption could prevent the application of Article 86.' t 3 The
Commission had found that Tetra Pak had abused its dominant position in the market for certain packaging materials by
acquiring a competitor that held an exclusive patent license for
a new packaging technology. The license fulfilled the requirements of block exemption Commission Regulation No. 2349/
84.114 Tetra Pak argued that this exemption prevented the
Commission from applying Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
The CFI held in this respect that Articles 85 and 86 are
complementary inasmuch as they pursue a common objective,
set out in Article 3(0.'
However, they provide for two independent legal instruments addressing different situations.
As regards the situation in Tetra Pak, the CFI held that one
should distinguish the mere acquisition of an exclusive license
from the situation which the Commission condemned under
Article 86.116 The Commission examined the license in question in the context of Tetra Pak's very dominant position,
which was reinforced by their acquisition of the only freely
available technology that allowed third parties to compete effectively with Tetra Pak. These circumstances constituted additional qualifications of the acquisition of the exclusive license
and justified the application of Article 86.
In more general terms, the CFI held that the grant of an
exemption, whether individual or block exemption, cannot
render Article 86 inapplicable. 1 7 It followed that the benefit
of a block exemption does not have to be withdrawn before
this Article can be applied.
The application of Article 86 requires in the first place that
the undertaking in question have a dominant position in a sub113. Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. UI-309,
316, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334, 342. The Court ofJustice had already decided in Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse
mbH, Case 107/76, [1977] E.C.R. 957, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 334 and Ahmed Saeed
Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale Zur Bekampfung Unlauteren
Wettbewerbs Ev, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102, that Articles
85 and 86 could be applied simultaneously.
114. Tetra Pak, [1990] E.C.R. at 338, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 368; Commission
Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. L 219/15 (1984), corrected by O.J. L 113/34 (1985).
115. Tetra Pak, [1990] E.C.R. at 340, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 370.
116. Id. at 342, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 371-72.
117. Id. at 342-43, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 372-73.
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stantial part of the common market."
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This condition nor-

mally means that the Commission should define the relevant
market and the position of the undertaking on this market visa-vis its competitors. Both definitions are interrelated; it is
easier to establish a dominant position on a narrowly defined
market than on a large one. This logic has often been the basis
of the Article 86 case law of the Community institutions." 9
The "Irish Television" cases, in which the CFI backed the
Commission's definition of the relevant market, offers an ex20
ample of this approach.1
In these cases, the Commission decided that the main
broadcasting organizations in Ireland had abused their dominant positions in the markets for the weekly listings of their
television programs and the guides in which they were published. The applicants argued before the CFI that the Commission's definition of the relevant product market was too
narrow. In their view this market should not only relate to
weekly program listings and television magazines based on
these listings, but to all advance program information supplied
to the public on a weekly or daily basis (i.e., newspapers). The
CFI ruled, however, that the market for listings constituted a
submarket within the market for television program information in general because the listings met a specific demand from
viewers and from third parties wishing to publish comprehensive television guides. Moreover, weekly listings are substitutable only to a limited extent with program publications in
newspapers, which cover a twenty-four-hour period.
In other words, the relevant market was of a derived nature: the listings of programs of each television organization.
In this market, dominance was quickly established with refer118. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 86.
119. See Centre Beige D'Etudes de Marche-Telemarketing SA v. Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion SA, Case 311/84, [1985] E.C.R. 3261, [1986] 2
C.M.L.R. 558; Hugin Kassaregister v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345; General Motors Continental NV v. Commission, Case 26/75,
[1975] E.C.R. 1367, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 95; Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, [19741 E.C.R.
223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309.
120. RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First
Instance July 10, 1991); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case T-70/89,
[1991] E.C.R. _, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television
Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-79/89, [1991] E.C.R. ,[1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
745 (Ct. First Instance July 10, 1991).
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ence to the copyright of the organizations on their individual
listings.
In Hilti AG v. Commission, the CFI followed a similar approach. 2 ' The CFI agreed with the Commission that the relevant market was the market for nails designed for use in Hilti
nail guns. 22 It emphasized in this context that independent
producers made nails intended for use in nail guns and that
some of them specialized in Hilti-compatible nails. In this derived market for Hilti-compatible nails, Hilti held a market
share oscillating between seventy percent and eighty percent. 2 3 Such a share was, in itself, a clear indication of a domi24
nant position. 1
The CFI was less complacent with the Commission's definition of dominance in Flat Glass.'2 5 In that case, the Commission decided that the three Italian producers held a collective
dominant position because of the oligopolistic nature of the
market and their close cooperation. 1 26 The CFI did not exclude the possibility that, in some situations, undertakings may
hold a collective dominant position, for example, where they
"jointly have, through agreements or licences, a technological
lead affording them the power to behave independently" of
other market participants. 12 7 It found support for this interpretation in Article 8(2) of Commission Regulation No. 4056/
86; liner conferences which benefit from an exemption may
nevertheless have effects which are incompatible with Article
86.128
121. Hilti AG v. Commission, Case T-30/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 12, 1991)
(not yet reported) [hereinafter Hilti].
122. Id. slip op. t 77.
123. Id. 89.
124. Id. 92.
125. Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. -, - [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302, -, $$ 340-69 (Ct: First Instance) (discussing application of Article 86
of EEC Treaty).
126. E.g., id. at _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at ,
350-56. The text of Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty mentions an "abuse by one or more undertakings." EEC Treaty,
supra note 2, art. 86. This is a matter ofjoint abuse and not a problem ofjoint dominance.
127. Flat Glass, [1992].E.C.R. at , [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -, 1 358; see Hoffman
La Roche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
128. Commission Regulation No. 4056/86, O.J. L 378/4 (1986). The Commission recently applied this regulation in a case which related, inter alia, to a problem
ofjoint dominance. See French-African Shipping Cartel, O.J. L 134/1 (1992).
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The CFI pointed out, however, that "for the purposes of
establishing an infringement of Article 86 of the [EEC] Treaty,
it is not sufficient ...

to 'recycle' the facts constituting an infringement of Article 85." 129 Moreover, the Commission

failed to give a proper definition of the relevant market and
also failed to substantiate its statement that the three producers presented themselves as a single entity on the market.
The CFI therefore annulled the Commission's decision as regards its assessment under Article 86.130
After having established the existence of a dominant position, the application of Article 86 requires that the undertakings abuse this position.'
In the "Irish television" cases, the
abuse consisted of the television companies' refusal to grant an
independent publisher licenses for its weekly listings. t 32 This
refusal prevented the publisher from marketing a new product,
a comprehensive weekly guide. The applicants did not accept
this analysis. They claimed that their policies on the distribution of information concerning the weekly programs did not
constitute an abuse because it was based upon their copyright.
The CFI ruled that the copyright policies were not necessary to protect the actual substance of the copyright because
they were not justified by the specific need to protect the intellectual efforts of the television companies in the broadcasting
sector. The television companies' conduct was characterized
by the prevention of the emergence of a new product likely to
compete with their own individual magazines, thereby using
copyright in the program listings to protect their monopolies
in the derivative market of weekly television guides. The anticompetitive nature of this conduct is emphasized by the fact
that the companies authorized, free of charge, the publication
of their listings in the press on a daily basis.
This analysis was based upon Volvo AB v. Erik Veng and
Consorzio Italiano della Componentistica de ricambioper autoveicoli v.
129. Flat Glass, [1992] E.C.R. at __, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at
130. Id. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.IL.R. at -,
361-68.

_,

360.

131. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 86.
132. RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. -, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First
Instance July 10, 1991); British Broadcasting Corp. v. Commission, Case T-70/89,
[1991] E.C.R. -, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 669 (Ct. First Instance); Independent Television
Publications Ltd. v. Commission, Case T-79/89, [1991] E.C.R. -, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
745 (Ct. First Instance July 10, 1991).
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Regie nationaledes usines Renault ("Maxicar"), in which the Court
of Justice ruled that the possibility for the owner of an exclusive design right to stop the production, sales and imports of
the protected model constituted the very substance of exclusivity and that the mere use of this possibility did not.give rise to
an abuse. 3 The Court ofJustice, however, defined three situations in which an abuse could occur: (1) the arbitrary refusal
to sell spare parts to independent repair shops; (2) unfair
prices; (3) the termination of the production of spare parts of a
model of which many cars still circulate. 13 4
These three situations do not concern a refusal to license
as such but illustrate the fact that the owner of an exclusive
right is unable or unwilling to supply the market on proper
terms. It is doubtful whether similar situations occurred in the
present case. RTE, ITV, and BBC did supply the market, albeit with magazines that only contained their individual programs. The logical consequence of the CFI's reasoning is that
the television companies must license a competitor in the market in which they operate themselves. This reasoning could be
interpreted as the negation of the exclusive nature of the copyrights involved.
One of the many abuses in Hilti also concerned a refusal
to license. 35 The situation in this case was, however, fundamentally different from those in the "Irish television" cases.
Hilti's patents were granted with the mention "licence of
right," which meant that third parties were, in principle, entitled to obtain licenses. 3 6 The CFI backed the Commission's
findings that Hilti frustrated or delayed legitimately available
licenses of right under its patents and that it operated discriminatory policies against the businesses of competitors.' 3 7
The last analytical step necessary under Article 86 con133. Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, [1989]
4 C.M.L.R. 122; Consorzio italiano della componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli
and Maxicar v. R6gie nationale des usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 265 [hereinafter Maxicar].
134. Maxicar, [1988] E.C.R. at 6073, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 283-84.
135. Hilti, Case T-30/89 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 12, 1991) (not yet reported).
136. Id. slip op. 15. For a description of this kind of license, see Allen & Hanbury's Ltd. v. Generics (U.K.) Ltd., Case 434/85, [1988] E.C.R. 1245, 1273 [1988] 1
C.M.L.R. 701, 714,
12-14.
137. Hilti, slip op.
99-101
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cerns the objective justification of the abusive conduct.13 8 The
dominant undertaking has the possibility to prove that special
circumstances explained and justified its conduct.'" 9 In Hilti,
the undertaking argued that its conduct was objectively justified by the necessity to protect the proper functioning of its
nail guns because the use of other nails would lead to fastening
problems. 140 Hilti explained that it was its duty under product
liability law to ensure that such problems did not occur. The
CFI did not accept this argument. It considered that at no
time had Hilti contacted the competent U.K. authorities for a
ruling that the use of other than Hilti nails was dangerous and
therefore banned.141 Hilti should have used the proper legislative channels and was not entitled to take steps on its own initiative to eliminate products which it considered to be dangerous.
D. ProceduralIssues

During its first three years, the CFI had to deal with a considerable amount of procedural issues. The order in which
these issues will be discussed tries to follow the structure of
Council Regulation No. 17/62 ("Regulation 17").142
A case is registered at DG-IV when it receives a notification, an official complaint or when its officials decide to open a
file ex officio. Article 10(1) of Regulation 17 obliges the Commission to transmit to the competent authorities of the Member States copies of the notification together with copies of the
with the Commission for
most important documents lodged
14 3
the purposes of its investigation.
The investigation of the case is usually based upon information obtained by the Commission, pursuant to Article I 1(1)
of Regulation 17.14' This provision allows the Commission to
request the necessary information from undertakings by let138. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 86.
139. See Luc Gyselen, Abuse of Monopoly Power within the Meaning of Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty: Recent Developments, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 597 (Barry E. Hawk

ed., 1990).
102-07.
140. Hilti, slip. op.
141. Id. 117.
142. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.0. 204 (1962), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 87.
143. Id. art. 10(1), 0J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 89.
144. Id. art. 11(1), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 90.
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ter.145 In Samenwerkende Elektriciteits-ProduktiebedrijrenNV (SEP)
v. Commission ("SEP"), the Dutch association of electricity producers had refused to send, upon the Commission's request, a
copy of a gas supply contract concluded with Statoil.' 46 The
association argued that this contract was not relevant for the
examination of its relation with its major gas supplier, Gasunie.
It also feared that the Commission would transmit, pursuant to
Article 10(1), a copy of the contract to the Dutch government,
the majority shareholder of Gasunie. Disclosure of the contract to Gasunie would undermine SEP's negotiating position.
In light of this refusal, the Commission adopted an official decision under Article 11 (5) ordering SEP to submit the contract.
This decision was attacked by SEP before the CFI.
The CFI had to decide first whether the information was
necessary within the meaning of Article 11 of Regulation 17. It
ruled that the Commission could legitimately consider that the
contract had a link with the suspected infringement of Article
85 or 86, because the Statoil contract had, as an element of the
context of the infringement, influenced the relationship between SEP and Gasunie. 14 7 The CFI subsequently dealt with
the confidentiality issue. It -held that even if the contract was
transmitted to the Dutch authorities they would be bound by
Article 20 of Regulation 17. This provision protects business
secrets and limits the use of the information obtained under
Article 11 to the purposes of the investigation.1 48 This means
that the Dutch authorities in charge of competition are not allowed to transmit the information to their colleagues dealing
with Gasunie. 149
Article 1 1 letters are not the only correspondence between undertakings and the Commission's officials. In the
145. Id.
146. Case T-39/90 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 12, 1991) (not yet reported) [hereinafter SEP].
147. Id. The CFI referred in this respect to Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/
87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502 and Solvay et CIE v. Commission,
Case 27/88, [1989] E.C.R. 3355, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 502.
148. See Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 142, art. 20, O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 93.
149. However, the national authorities in charge of competition may use the
information they receive from the Commission as a starting point for their own investigations under national competition law. See Direcci6n General de Defensa de la
Competencia v. Associaci6n Espafiola de Banca Privada, Case C-67/91 (Eur. Ct. J.
July 16, 1992) (not yet reported).
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"Dutch pharmaceutical" cases, the undertakings involved challenged a letter sent by the Commissioner in charge of competition policy to the Dutch government. 50 The letter concerned
an agreement concluded by drug companies, wholesalers, insurers, pharmacists, and doctors aimed at saving costs by price
reductions. The parties would implement the scheme if the
Dutch government changed certain provisi6ns of drug reimbursement regulations. The government was not prepared to
accept the agreement before it was established that its approval would not infringe the EEC Treaty. Following a meeting with two members of the Dutch government, the Commissioner informed them that, in his view, the Commission could
only envisage the adoption of a positive decision if two conditions were fulfilled: the parties should modify their agreement
and its effects should be reassessed after a one year monitoring
period. He specified that his personal view on the agreement
would not affect the procedural rights of the parties concerned.
The Commissioner's letter produced a kind of stalemate
which satisfied neither the parties to the agreement nor the association of parallel importers and generic drug suppliers,
Prodifarma, which had lodged a complaint with DG-IV against
the scheme. When some of the parties and Prodifarma challenged the letter before the CFI, the Commission raised an exception of inadmissibility, pursuant to Article 92 of the Court
of Justice's Rules of Procedure applicable mutatis mutandis to
the CFI untilJuly 1, 1991.111 It argued that the letter did not
constitute a challengeable act under Article 173 of the EEC
Treaty. 152 The CFI accepted this argument, and held that the
letter did not produce any legally binding effect.' 5 3 The Dutch

government could not be bound by the personal views of one
150. Nefarma, Case T- 113/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-797 (Ct. First Instance); VNZ,
Case T- 114/89, [1990] E.C.R 11-827 (Ct. First Instance); Prodifarma I, Case T- 116/
89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-843 (Ct. First Instance); Prodifarma II, Case T-3/90, [1991]
E.C.R. II-I (Ct. First Instance). For a more detailed comment of these cases, see H.
Kirschner, Die Abgrenzung des Verwaltungsaktes von anderen beh'rdlichen Handlungen, vor
allem zur Beeinflussung wirtschaftlicher Ablaufe, in DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES GERICHTS
ERSTER INSTANZ DER EG (1991).
151. ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 60, art. 92(1), OJ. C 39/1, at 22 (1982).
152. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 173.

153. Nefarma, [1990] E.C.R. 11-797; VNZ, [1990] E.C.R 11-827; Prodifarma I,
[19901 E.C.R. 11-843; Prodifarma 1H, [1991] E.C.R. II-1.
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Commissioner on Articles 85 and 86, which are applicable to
undertakings and not to public authorities. Nor could the letter be seen as a final decision vis-A-vis the companies involved.
The wording of the letter and the proviso concerning the procedural rights implied that the letter constituted the beginning
of the investigation of the case.
After the investigation of a case, pursuant to the provisions of Regulation 17, the Commission must decide whether
the final result will be negative or positive for the companies
involved.' 5 4 If it decides to adopt a negative clearance or an
exemption, the Commission can usually count on the cooperation of the notifying parties.' 5 5 The situation may be different
if a third party has lodged a complaint. A positive stand on the
agreement or practice, whether or not it is notified, necessarily
implies that the Commission does not intend to act upon its
complaint. Regulation 17 does not determine how the Commission should act in these circumstances. The only provision
which directly concerns the rejection of complaints is Article 6
of Regulation 99; if the Commission considers that there are
insufficient grounds for granting the application, it shall inform the applicants of its reasons and fix a time limit for them
56
to submit any further comments in writing.'
In Automec Srl v. Commission, the CFI clarified the functioning of this obscure provision. 5 7 It specified that the procedure
foreseen by Article 6 has three distinct phases. 58 In the first
phase the Commission's services investigate the case which is
opened upon a complaint. 5 9 During this phase the officials in
charge and the applicant may exchange views and information
on an informal basis. The preliminary opinions expressed by
these services on these occasions cannot be qualified as chal154. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 142, arts. 2, 3(1), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 88.
155. But see Sadolin & Holmblad A/S, Members of the Transocean Marine Paint
Ass'n v. Commission, Case 17/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1063, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 459;
Nederlandse Bankiersvereniging v. Commission, Case T-138/89 (Ct. First Instance
Sept. 17, 1992) (not yet reported).
156. Regulation No. 99/63, art. 6, 127 J.O. 2268 (1963), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1963-64, at 48.
157. Automec Sri v. Commission, Case T-64/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-367, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 177 (Ct. First Instance). For a more detailed description of this case, see

Kirschner, supra note 150.
158. Automec, [1990] E.C.R. at 11-382, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 189-90.
159. Id.

1992-1993]

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

445

lengeable acts within the meaning of Article 173.160

The second phase starts with a notice sent to the applicant
informing him that the Commission considers that there are
insufficient grounds for granting the application. 6 ' This notice may be seen, in the relation between the Commission and
the complainant, as the equivalent of a statement of objections
in the relation between the Commission and the accused undertaking. Since the Court of Justice ruled in IBM v. Commission that such a statement is not a challengeable act, an appeal
62
against an Article 6 notice is inadmissible as well.'
In the third phase the Commission definitively rejects the
complaint. 63 The Commission's competence to reject the
complaint is not explicitly foreseen by Article 6, but was recognized by the Court of Justice in several cases. The final rejection of the complaint is an official act and can be challenged
under Article 173.'64
If the Commission considers that there are sufficient
grounds for action under Articles 85 and 86, it must inform the
undertakings, pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation 99, of the
objections raised against them. 65 Article 3 of the same regulation provides that the undertakings shall make known in writing their views concerning these objections. 166 Despite this
mandatory wording, the CFI decided in Hilti that undertakings
do not have the obligation to reply to the statement of objections and that the absence of any reply does not affect their
locus standi before the CFI if they raise arguments against the
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. International Business Machines Corp. v. Commission, Case 60/81, [1981]
E.C.R. 2639, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 635. The CFI's assessment of an Article 6 notice
gives an answer to the question left open in GEMA Gesellschaft f'ir musikalische
Aulftihrungs-und mechanische Vervielfiltigungsrechte v. Commission, Case 125/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 3173, [1980] 2 C.M.L.R. 177.
163. Automec, [1990] E.C.R. at 11-383, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 191.
164. Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission, Case 210/81, [1983] E.C.R. 3045,
[1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 63; Comit des industries cinematographiques des Communaut~s
europennes (CICCE) v. Commission, Case 298/83, [1985] E.C.R. 1105, [1986] 1
C.M.L.R. 486 [hereinafter CICCE]; British American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds
Indus. v. Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988]
C.M.L.R. 24; see Automec II, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431
(Ct. First Instance).
165. Commission Regulation No. 99/63, supra note 156, art. 2, OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1963-64, at 47-48.
166. Id. art. 3, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 48.
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Commission's final decision. 167
In most cases, however, the accused undertakings want to
defend themselves against the Commission's objections. In
Polypropylene, two undertakings argued that the possibility for
an effective defense did not exist, because the Commission's
officials in charge of the case combined both the inspection
and reporting function.' 6 8 This dual role would necessarily affect their impartiality and, hence, the legality of the preparation of the decision. The CFI rejected these arguments. It
ruled that the Commission is not a "jurisdiction" within the
meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, but that Regulations 17 and 99 nevertheless provide
for a contradictory procedure. These regulations elaborate a
fundamental principle of Community law which requires that
the rights of the defense should be respected in any procedure
and which implies, in particular, that the undertaking concerned should be in a position to make its views known on any
facts raised against it.' 6 9
Some undertakings in Polypropylene considered that an effective defense required full access to the Commission's file,
and, in particular, to those parts of the file which could contain
evidence favorable to them. In its reply to these arguments the
Commission relied upon the case law of the Court of Justice,
according to which regard for the rights of the defense does
not require that an undertaking be able to comment on all of
the documents forming part of the Commissioin's file because
there are no provisions requiring the Commission to divulge
the contents of its files to the parties concerned. 170 The CFI
accepted the Commission's reasoning, but considered it incomplete. It observed that in establishing a procedure for pro167. Hilti, Case T-30/89, slip op.

37-38 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 12, 1991)

(not yet reported). The same holds true for the locus standi of a complainant. See
CICCE, [1985] E.C.R. 1105, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 486.
168. See supra note 52 (listing Polypropylene cartel cases); Shell, Case T- 11/89,
slip op. 39 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Montedipe v. Commission, Case T-14/89, slip op. 319 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet
reported).
169. See SA Musique Diffusion Fran~aise v. Commission, Joined Cases 100-103/
80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221 [hereinafter Pioneer].
170. Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, _ [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 265,
52 (citing Re Dutch Books: VBVB &.VBBB v. Commission,Joined Cases 43 & 63/82,
[1984] E.C.R. 19, 59, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 27).
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viding access to files in its Twelfth Competition Report, the Commission imposed on itself rules exceeding the requirements
laid down by the Court ofJustice and that the Commission may
not depart from rules which it has imposed on itself.' 7' It fol-

lows that the Commission has the obligation to disclose all
documents, whether favorable or otherwise, which it has obtained during the course of its investigation, save where business secrets, internal administrative documents, or other confi72
dential information are involved. 1

However, the Commission's refusal to grant access to its
files did not lead to a breach of the rights of the defense, because it could not be established that the Commission had
withheld exonerating evidence. 7 1 It would have been necessary only to examine whether these rights were infringed, if in
the absence of that refusal the administrative proceedings
could have led to a different result than the one reached in the
contested decision.
During the administrative proceedings in SA Cimenteries
CBR v. Commission, the Commission again refused to grant full
access to its files, this time for confidentiality reasons. 174 The
companies involved requested the President of the CFI to order the Commission to grant them access, pursuant to Article
186 of the EEC Treaty. The President rejected their application because the parties did not suffer any serious and irreparable harm. If the CFI were to rule in the main proceedings that
the Commission's refusal was illegal, the Commission would
have to re-open its own proceedings and grant access to its
files. The outcome of Cimenteries depends upon the discretion
which the Commission has for refusing access for reasons of
confidentiality.
As regards confidentiality issues, the CFI adopted an interesting order in Hilti. 175 It concerned a request by two of
Hilti's competitors to intervene in the procedure before the
171. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 265-66, 53.
172. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 266, 54.
173. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 266-67,
55-56.
174. Joined Cases T-10-12, 14 & 15/92, slip op. 50 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 23,
1992) (not yet reported). The CFI confirmed the Order of the President on December 18, 1992 (not yet reported).
175. Hilti Aktiengesellschaft v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1990] E.C.R. II163, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 602 (Ct. First Instance).
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CFI. 7 6 The rules of procedure then in effect prescribed that
interveners are to receive a copy of every document served on
the parties, except when it is subject to confidential treatment. 7 7 It follows from AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission that
written communication between an independent lawyer and its
client is confidential because it is covered by legal professional
privilege.'7 s The CFI extended the scope of this principle to
internal notes of the undertaking reporting on external legal
advice. Even if this order of the CFI only concerns its own
procedure, it reflects the CFI's general attitude towards legal
professional privilege and it is therefore relevant for the assessment of the scope of the Commission's powers under Article 14 of Regulation 17.179
The right of undertakings to be heard means that they can
make their views known not only in writing, but orally as well.
Article 9(4) of Regulation 99 provides that the parties have the
right to approve the minutes of the hearing.' 8 0 In Polypropylene,
the CFI ruled that the violation of this right could affect the
legality of this decision only if the Advisory Committee and the
Commission itself would have expressed different views if they
had known the contents of the approved minutes.' 8 ' With reference to Re Dutch Books: Vereniging ter Bevordering van het
Vlaamse Boekwezen (VBVB) & Anor v. Commission, the CFI specified that the parties do not have a right to comment on the
8 2
report of the hearing officer.'
After the hearing of the parties, the contradictory phase of
the administrative proceedings is closed. If the Commission
176. Id. at 11-166, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 604.
177. Id. at 11-168, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 605 (citing ECJ Rules of Procedure,
supra note 60, art. 93(4), O.J. C 39/1 (1982).
178. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264.
179. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 142, art. 14, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 91. This view is confirmed by M. A. Fierstra, Het legal privilege opnieuw
beschouwd, 39 SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 699 (1991).
180. Commission Regulation No. 99/63, supra note 156, art. 9(4), O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1963-64, at 48.
181. See Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R.

265,

__

,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84,

51 (Ct. First Instance).
182. See id at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 265, 52 (discussing Vereniging ter
Bevordering van bet Vlaamse Boekwezen (VBVB) & Anor v. Commission, Joined
Cases 43 & 63/82, [1984] E.C.R. 19, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 27)); ICI, Case T-13/89, slip
op.
40-41 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported).
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wants to continue these proceedings in view of a final decision,
it has to consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies, pursuant to Article 10(3) of Regulation
17.183 The CFI decided in Vichy that the text of Articles 10 and
15 of that regulation did not require such a consultation in
proceedings initiated under Article 15(6). t84 This provision
enables the Commission to withdraw the immunity from fines
in cases where the notified agreement infringes Article 85(1)
and clearly does not merit an exemption under Article 85(3).
This procedure is a useful weapon against delaying tactics of
notifying parties which count on the Commission's inertia for
the pursuit of their restrictive objectives while benefitting from
an immunity against fines.
An Article 15(6) decision corresponds in some respects to
interim measures.1 85 Both are provisional steps pending the
final decision in the case. There are some differences. Interim
measures enable the Commission to impose a certain conduct
86
on undertakings, even if they did not notify their agreement.'
Article 15(6) decisions have a more limited scope; they merely
withdraw a benefit and do not require the notifying parties to
change their'behavior. 18 7 However, the practical effect of such
decisions will normally be the termination of the notified
agreements because the risk of being fined is considerably increased. This means that the Commission can obtain under
Article 15(6) the same results as it would with interim measures without having to consult the Advisory Committee. 88 It
is possible to infer from the CFI's case law on interim meas183. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 142, art. 10(3),'O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 92.
184. Vichy, Case T-19/91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27, 1992) (not yet reported).
185. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 142, art. 15(6), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 90.
186. See Peugeot v. Commission, Case T-23/90R, [1990] E.C.R. 11-195 (Ct. First
Instance).
187. It should be noted that an Article 15(6) decision also gives a clear indication to national jurisdictions. It follows from Portelange v. Smith Corona, Case 43/
69, [1969] E.C.R. 309, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 426, that such a decision makes an end to
the provisional validity of old agreements.
188. It is the Commission's practice to consult the Advisory Committee for interim measures. However, it is unclear whether it has an obligation to do so. See
Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Ford-Werke AG v. Commission, Joined Cases
25 & 26/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2725, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 528 (considering whether this
obligation exists).
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ures and Article 15(6) that the latter procedure has another
advantage for the Commission. In Prodifarma the CFI ruled
that a complainant cannot compel the Commission to adopt an
Article 15(6) decision under Article 175, whereas in La Cinq it
annulled, upon request of a complainant, the Commission's refusal to adopt interim measures.' 8 9
In Vichy, the CFI specified the conditions which allow the

Commission to act under Article 15(6).19o With reference to
the Court of Justice's 1967 judgment in Cimenteries it considered that this procedure may be followed if the infringement of
Article 85(1) is so manifest and serious that an exemption
seems excluded.' 9 ' The CFI held that the three circumstances

put forward by the Commission met this requirement: a complaint lodged by Cosimex illustrating the concrete restrictive
effects of Vichy's network, its own APB decision as a precedent
and the decisions adopted by the French competition authorities.' 92 It should be noted that the complaint was rejected.
This seems to imply that the existence of precedents, including
national ones, is sufficient for recourse to Article 15(6). The
CFI did not examine whether or not urgency was required.
After consultation with the Advisory Committee or after
the contradictory phase in Article 15(6) proceedings, DG-IV
sends the case to the Commission. From that moment onwards, the President, with the assistance of the Executive Secretary, must ensure that the Commission takes its collegiate
decision according to its Rules of Procedure. 9 3 Article 10 of
these rules states that minutes of all meetings shall be taken
and that the draft minutes shall be authenticated by the President and the Executive Secretary. 94 Article 12 of the rules
reads as follows:
Acts adopted by the Commission, at a meeting or by written
189. Prodifarma I, Case T-1 16/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-843; Prodifarma II, Case T3/90, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1; La Cinq SA v. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R.
-,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 449 (Ct. First Instance).
190. Vichy, Case T-19/91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27,1 1992) (not yet reported).
191. Id. (citing Re Noordwijks Cement Accord: Cimenteries CBR Cementsbedrijren NV v. Commission, Joined Cases 8-11/66, [1967] E.C.R. 75, [1967]
C.M.L.R. 77).
192. APB, O.J. L 18/35 (1990).
193. Rules of Procedure of the Commission, 17J.O. 181 (1963), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 2d 1974, at 11.
194. Id. art. 10, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 2d i974, at 11.
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procedure, shall be authenticated in the language or languages in which they are binding by the signatures of the
President and the Executive Secretary.
The texts of such acts shall be annexed to the minutes in
which their adoption is recorded.
The President shall, as may be required, notify acts adopted
95
by the Commission to those to whom they are addressed. 1
Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure states that the Executive Secretary "shall take the necessary steps to. ensure official
notification of acts of the Commission and their publication in
the OfficialJournal of the European Communities." 19 6
In Re the PVC Cartel.- BASF AG v Commission, the CFI considered that something went fundamentally wrong with the application of these rules. 19 7 The CFI found, in the first place,
that the draft decisions submitted in English, French and German to the Commission on December 14, 1988 differed from
the decisions ultimately served upon the companies. 98 These
differences were more important than mere linguistic corrections and affected both the reasoning and the operative part of
the decisions. The CFI, therefore, held that these modifications were contrary to the principle of the unalterability of the
adopted measure and, hence, to Article 190 of the EEC
Treaty. 99 The CFI also established that the Commissioner in
charge was not competent to issue the contested decisions.2 0 0
In analyzing the minutes of the Commission's meeting, the CFI
determined that the decisions were not adopted in Dutch and
Italian, which were authentic texts within the meaning of Article 12 of the Rules of Procedure. 20 1 The CFI held that Article
27 of these rules does not allow the Commission to delegate
the preparation of such texts.2 °2 Therefore, the Commissioner
was not competent to sign the decisions in these languages. 20 3
195. Id. art. 12, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed: 2d 1974, at 12.
196. Id. art. 16(3), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 2d 1974, at 12.
197. PVC, Joined Cases T-79, 84-86, 89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89,
[1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (Ct. First Instance).
198. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 367-68, $$ 16-19.
199. Id. at ,[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 373, 35 (citing Re the Protection of Battery
Hens: United Kingdom v. Council, Case 131/86, [1988] E.C.R. 11-905, [1988] 2
C.M.L.R. 364 (Ct. First Instance)).
200. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 381-82, 77 61-63.
201. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 380, $ 55.
202. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 380-81, $$ 56-57.
203. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 381, 60.
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Moreover, the Commissioner was not competent to sign ratione
temporis. 20 4 When, on the last day of his term as Commissioner,
Peter Sutherland signed the letters notifying the contested
measures, the various language versions of these measures
were not yet finalized and could therefore not be notified.20 5
The CFI specified that this defect could have been remedied if
the Commission had proved that his signatures only concerned
the copies of the decisions notified to the undertakings and
that the originals were signed by a properly authorized person. 20 6 However, the Commission was unable to produce the
original of these decisions.20 7
The alterations in the texts and the lack of competence of
the authority issuing the measures could have been considered
as grounds for the annulment of the decisions. However, the
CFI examined instead the arguments of the applicants relating
to the non-existence of the measures. It held in this respect
that the Community judges declare non-existent a measure
which is vitiated by particularly serious and manifest defects
and that the plea of non-existence concerns a matter of public
interest which may be relied upon at any time during the proceedings and which the judge must raise ex officio. 2 °8 In light of
the serious defects already found, the CFI ordered the Commission to produce the decision of the Commission in its original and authenticated form. 2 9 The only documents submitted
by the Commission were the draft decisions in three languages, two extracts from minutes and the letter of January 5,
1989 signed by Commissioner Sutherland.2 10
It could not be established, therefore, that Article 12 had
been respected. This provision is of fundamental importance
for the legal certainty of those subject to measures adopted by
the Community institutions. Only when a measure is adopted
by the full Commission, duly authenticated by the signatures of
the President and the Executive Secretary and combined with
the minutes of the .meeting, is it possible to be certain of the
204. Id.
205. Id. at
206. Id. at

-,
-,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 382, 63.
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 382-83, 64.

207. Id.
208. Id. at
209. Id. at
210. Id. at

-,
-,
-,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 384-85,
68.
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 385, 69.
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 385, 70.
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existence of that measure, its content and to be sure that it
corresponds exactly to the intention of the Commission. 21 '
The importance of authentication is confirmed by the fact that
natural and legal persons may rely upon the institution's Rules
of Procedure, in so far as the provisions create rights and contribute to legal certainty for such persons.2 t2 The CFI referred
to Article 192 of the EEC Treaty in this respect, which allows
national jurisdictions to verify the authenticity of Community
3
measures.

21

The lack of authentication in the confusing context of the
case implied that the CFI could not exactly determine the date,
the content and the issuing authority of the measures. The
CFI concluded that these measures could not be regarded as
decisions within the meaning of Article 189 of the EEC
Treaty.2 14 Hence, the applications were addressed against
non-existent decisions and were rejected as inadmissible. 1 5
The judgment in PVC has created much confusion. If the
way the Commission operated in PVC reflects its normal decisional practice, many of its acts could be threatened by "nonexistence" and the fines eventually imposed should be reimbursed. This idea has inspired many lawyers. In the LdPE
case, which is still pending before the CFI and which was "decided" by the Commission on the same date as PVC, the parties have raised the issue and a special hearing has been held
for this matter.216 In Polypropylene, several companies asked for
a re-opening of the procedure before the CFI, relying upon the
non-existence of the decision. The CFI rejected their request.
It considered that a regularly notified and published decision is
presumed to exist and to be valid. The applicants should put
forward sufficient arguments to rebut this presumption. The
CFI concluded that the applicants had failed in this respect.
The companies concerned have appealed this ruling before the
Court ofJustice. The final say belongs to the Court of Justice
211. Id. at , [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 386, 74.
212. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 385-86, 72.
213. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 192.
214. PVC, [1992] E.C.R. at _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 391-92, $ 96.
215. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 393-94,
101-02.
216. LdPE,Joined Cases T-80, 81, 83, 87, 88, 90, 93, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103,
105, 107 & 112/89 (Ct. First Instance not yet decided); Commission Decision No.
89/191, OJ. L 74, at 21 (1989).
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which has to pronounce itself on these appeals and on the appeal lodged by the Commission in PVC. It is hoped that the
Court of Justice will be able to clarify the Commission's existential problem rapidly. Otherwise, the amount of new cases
on this issue will continue to increase. Many companies have
already contacted the Commission claiming a refund of their
fines.
Whatever the final outcome of this issue may be, it should
be noted that the CFI's approach in PVC is very formalistic and
that it contrasts with the more flexible approach followed on
procedural issues in other cases. The refusal to grant access to
files and the violation of Article 9(4) of Regulation 99 in
Polypropylene did not have any consequences for the legality of
the Commission's decision, because these defects did not affect
the rights of the parties in substance. The fact that the period
of notification foreseen by Article 10 of Regulation 17 for
meetings of the Advisory Committee was not respected did not
have any consequences in RTE also, because violation of this
purely internal rule only affects the legality of the procedure if
the Committee was not able to deliver its opinion in full knowledge of the facts. These cases illustrate that the CFI is prepared to go beyond formalities in order to examine whether
the parties's individual rights were really affected. A substantive analysis from this angle in PVC would perhaps have led to
a different result. Finally, the judgment in PVC is surprising,
even from a purely formal point of view: does it require 103
grounds and sixty pages to rule that something is non-existent?
17

E. Interim Measures 1

The Court ofJustice decided in Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission that the Commission had the power under Article 3 of
Regulation 17 to adopt interim measures in cases proved to be
urgent, in order to avoid a situation likely to cause serious and
irreparable damage to the party seeking their adoption, or
which is intolerable for the public interest. 21 8 In La Cinq, the
217. In 1987, Mr. Temple Lang made an interesting inventory of procedural
issues with which the CFI could be confronted. See Temple Lang, supra note 60.
218. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, Case 792/79R, [1980] E.C.R. 119,
[1980] 1 C.M.L.R. 334.
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CFI specified this case law.2" 9 La Cinq, a French television
company, had lodged a complaint with the Commission relating to the conduct of the European Broadcasting Union
("EBU") which is in charge of exchanges of programs throughout Europe, like Eurovision. 2 ° Its complaint concerned, in
particular, EBU's refusal to accept La Cinq as a member and to
give it access to the programs. 2 ' In its complaint, La Cinq
requested interim measures. 2222 The Commission considered
that it was not in a position to adopt such measures because
neither the a priori existence of a clear and flagrant infringement of Articles 85 and 86 nor serious and irreparable damage
23
could be established.

2

The CFI held that this refusal was sufficiently motivated
within the meaning of Article 190 of the EEC Treaty. 224 However, the reasons upon which this motivation relied were not
valid. As regards the first reason, the CFI considered that the
Commission had confused the condition of a prima facie infringement.with the certainty of an infringement required for a
final decision. In other words, the grant of interim measures
does not require that a clear and flagrant infringement be established.225 With respect to the second reason, the CFI found
that the Commission had also given a wrong interpretation to
the concept of serious and irreparable damage. 6 This condition does not mean that the damage cannot be repaired by any
later decision of the Commission, but that the damage cannot
be repaired by the final decision in the main proceedings.
Moreover, the CFI found that the Commission had not properly assessed the facts of the case. 7 In light of these findings,
the CFI annulled the Commission's refusal to grant interim
measures. 228
The judgment in La Cinq raises the question whether the
219.
C.M.L.R.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

La Cinq SA v. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R.
449, 457-58 (Ct. First Instance).
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 452-54.
Id. at
,[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 455.
Id.
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 456.
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 460-61.
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 464-65.
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 465.
Id.
Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 470.

-,

-,

[1992] 4
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Commission has the obligation to adopt interim measures
when the newly defined conditions of Camera Care are met. In
light of the CFI's recent ruling in Automec H, it would not be
consistent to impose such an obligation on the Commission. 2 29
Indeed, the CFI decided in that case that the Commission may
reject a complaint for the sake of expediency if certain conditions are fulfilled. In any event, the President of the CFI will
not order the Commission to adopt interim measures on behalf of a complainant, pursuant to Article 186 of the EEC
Treaty.2 30 In Cosimex GmbH v. Commission, the President of the
CFI ruled that such an order would be contrary to the principle
governing the distribution of powers between the different
Community institutions. 23 He also pointed out that the CFI
cannot oblige the Commission to reconsider a request for interim measures without having declared void the act embodying the refusal to adopt the relevant interim measures.2 3 2
However, the President of the CFI may grant interim relief
against a Commission decision on interim measures. In
Peugeot, the President held that it is sufficient, for the purposes
of Article 186 of the EEC Treaty, to consider whether the submissions relied on prima faciejustify a suspension of the operation of the Commission's decision and whether the maintenance of this decision until the CFI has given its judgment in
the main proceedings is likely to cause serious and irreparable
damage to the applicants.2 3 3 When applying this rule to the
facts of the case, he found that Peugeot had a prima facie case
as regards its legal arguments. 2 34 This was not enough to suspend the Commission's interim measures. Since the Commission's decision itself was of a temporary nature, the President
also found it necessary to consider whether there was a serious
risk that the detrimental effects of that decision would exceed
those of a conservatory measure and in the meantime cause
229. Automec II, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct.
First Instance). This problem was already foreseen by John Temple Lang, supra note
60, at 600.
230. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 186.
231. Cosimex GmbH v. Commission, Case T-131/89R, [1990] E.C.R. I-l,
1,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 395, 397 (Ct. First Instance).
232. Id.
233. Peugeot v. Commission, Case T-31/89R, [1990] E.C.R. 11-309 (Ct. First
Instance July 12, 1991) (not yet reported).
234. Id.
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damage considerably in excess of the inevitable but short-lived
disadvantages arising from such a measure.2 5 This test implied that a balance should be struck between the interests of
Peugeot and those of the company which the Commission
sought to protect. The President decided on this basis that
Peugeot's request for interim relief against the Commission's
236
interim measures should be dismissed.
Langnese and Sch"ller v. Commission also concerned an application pursuant to Articles 185 and 186 against the Commission's interim measures.2 37 In this case, the President actively
intervened in order to find a compromise solution. The case
concerned the exclusive purchasing contracts concluded by
Langnese and Sch6ller with a considerable number of German
retailers for the distribution of ice cream. The Commission
had ordered these companies to waive the exclusivity of the
purchasing contracts in order to give Mars access to the ice
cream market. Both companies requested the suspension of
this decision during the proceedings before the CFI.
The President noted that the final judgment could not repair the effects of the Commission decision which concerned
the summer season of 1992 and that the arguments of the applicants were not unfounded. In such circumstances a balance
should be struck between the interests of a good administration of justice and the interests of all the parties involved. A
refusal to suspend the contested decision would cause irreparable damage to the distribution networks of the applicants,
whereas a suspension would exclude Mars from the German
market for the summer of 1992. The compromise solution
consisted of limited access for Mars to certain identifiable outlets, such as ice cream sold at petrol stations.
The President was requested to rule under Articles 185
and 186 of the EEC Treaty on three other occasions.238 In
SEP, he dismissed the application because the Commission's
235. Id. (referring to Ford of Europe Inc. and Ford-Werke Aktiengesellschaft v.
Commission, Joined Cases 228 & 229/82, [1984] E.C.R. 1129, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R.
649).
236. Id. at 11-204, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at.
237. Joined Cases T-24 & 28/92, (Ct. First InstanceJune 16, 1992) (not yet reported).
238. SEP, Case T-39/90R, [1990] E.C.R. 11-649, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 27 (Ct. First
Instance), appeal dismissed, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 33; Vichy, Case T-19/
91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27, 1992) (not yet reported); SA Cimenteries CBR v. Corn-

458 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 16:412

decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(5) of Regulation 17
did not cause any serious and irreparable harm;213 9 the protection of the interest of this company was sufficiently protected
by Articles 10 and 20 of Regulation 17 which prevent national
competition authorities from using the information they receive from the Commission for purposes other than those of
the Commission's investigation. 2 40 The application in Vichy
was also unsuccessful. 2 4 1 The President considered that an Article 15(6) decision only reflects the Commission's preliminary
views and does not contain any injunction vis-A-vis the undertaking concerned. Such a decision cannot cause any irreparable and serious damage. The same holds true for the Commission's refusal to grant access to its files
F. Fines
After the partial annulment of a decision, the CFI must reassess the level of fines imposed by the Commission. The
Polypropylene and Flat Glass judgments give a clear indication of
the method of reassessment; the participation of the companies concerned to the restrictive agreement ratione temporis and
ratione materiae is established and determines the new level of
fines.
The Polypropylene judgments contain some other interesting observations on the criteria upon which the Commission
may rely under Article 15 of Regulation 17. The fact that in
previous cases the Commission had considered that the crisis
affecting the economic sector had to be taken into account did
not oblige the Commission to take similar account of such a
situation in Polypropylene since it had been proved that the undertakings involved had deliberately committed a particularly
serious infringement of Article 85(1). Nor was the introduction of compliance programs considered as a mitigating factor
by the CFI, even if the Commission had done otherwise in another case. 4 2 This seems to imply that the criteria applied in
mission, Joined Cases T-10-12/92 & 15/92 (Ct. First Instance Dec. 18, 1992) (not yet
reported).
239. SEP, [1990] E.C.R. at 11-657, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at.
240. Id. at 656-57, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at.
241. Vichy, slip op.
242. Napier Brown-British Sugar, O.J. L 284/41 (1988).
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one case does not have a precedential value for other cases.243
The CFI also held that the Commission may consider repeated infringements (recidivation) by an undertaking as an
aggravating factor.2 4 4 It specified, however, that the absence
of any previous infringement is a normal circumstance which
the Commission does not have to take into account as a mitigating factor.
Finally, one factor deserves particular attention. In the
practice of the Commission and the Court ofJustice, the cooperative attitude of the companies concerned has normally been
considered as a mitigating factor.2 4 5 In POlypropylene, ICI had
been particularly helpful. This was the reason why the Commission reduced ICI's fines by ten percent. This was not
enough according to the CFI. It considered that ICI had
given, upon the Commission's request, very detailed answers
which not only dealt with ICI's individual involvement but also
with the position of other undertakings. 246 Without this information the Commission's work Would have been much more
difficult. ICI therefore contributed to making an end to the
infringements. Because of this contribution ICI's fines were
24 7
reduced from ECU10,000,000 to ECU9,000,000.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The CFI is, in principle, not bound by judgments of the
Court of Justice. It may develop its own jurisprudence. However, the possibility to appeal its decisions before the Court of
Justice implies that the CFI has to respect the Court ofJustice's
case law in practice.248 Moreover, the CFI frequently refers to
the judgments of the Court of Justice as a basis for its reasoning. This may be seen as a confirmation of the fact that it considers itself bound by these judgments. This means that the
243. ICI, Case T-13/89, slip op. 7 389-98 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992)
(not yet reported) (discussing ICI's cooperation with Commission).
244. Id. 395.
245. See Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v. Commission, Case C-277/87,
[1990] E.C.R. 45.
246. ICI, slip op. 393.
247. Id.
393-94.
248. See MILLET, supra note 1, at 74; but see A. Arhull, Owning up to Fallibility:
Precedent and the Court of Justice COMMON MKT. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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scope of the CFI's review of Commission decisions is determined by the Court of Justice.
It should be noted that the decisions adopted by the Com-

mission in the field of competition cases often contain an appraisal of complex economic matters. In such cases judicial review is limited to verifying whether the facts are correct,
whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied
with, and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers. 24 9 This section examines how
the CFI deals with these three interrelated questions. 50
A. Facts
Judge Vesterdorf acting as Advocate General in
Polypropylene held that
it is clear from the preamble to the Council's decision of 24
October 1988 that the very creation of the Court of First
Instance as a court of both first and last instance for the
examination of facts in the cases brought before it is an invitation to undertake an intensive review in order to ascertain
whether the evidence on which the Commission relies in
adopting a contested decision is sound.2 5 '
The case law of the CFI shows that it has taken this invitation
seriously. Its control of facts is very thorough and detailed,
even in cases concerning time limits. 2 52 However, this control
249. See Remia BV v. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 1; British American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds Indus. v. Commission,
Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24; La Cinq SA v.
Commission, Case T-44/90, [19921 E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 449 (Ct. First Instance).
250. Factual and procedural issues and procedural questions are often difficult
to distinguish. See Temple Lang, supra note 60, at 585; Francis G. Jacobs, Court of
Justice Review of Competition Cases, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 543-44 (Barry E.
Hawk ed., 1988).
251. Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991]
E.C.R. -, - [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 125, § I.B.I. The factual control exercised by the
Court ofJustice has not always been satisfactory, as some Members of the Court have
admitted. See U. Everling, "Zur richterlichen Kontrolle der Tatsachenfeststellungen
durch die Kommission in Wettbewerbssachen," Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, 884,
887, 890 (1989); Ole Due, The Court of First Instance, 1988 Y.B. EUR. L. 1, 6 (1989); Sir
Gordon Slynn, EEC Competition Law from the Perspective of the Court ofJustice, in 1987
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 392 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988).
252. See Filtrona Espanola SA v. Commission, Case T-125/89, [1990] E.C.R.
393, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 832 (Ct. First Instance); Bayer, Case T-12/90, [1991] E.C.R.
219.

1992-1993]

THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

461

may only be exercised when the facts are disputed. 5 3 The CFI
is a jurisdiction deciding in contradictory proceedings and may
not carry out an active investigation on its own initiative. One
may wonder whether this principle of judicial restraint has
been completely respected in PVC and Flat Glass.
In the first case, the problem relating to the existence of
the contested decision had not been put forward as a distinct
plea in the applications.254 The problem only arose to its full
extent after the CFI had actively intervened in the proceedings, particularly at the hearing during which it had ordered
the Commission to produce the original of the decision.25
The CFI justified its active role by stating that the plea of nonexistence concerns a matter of public interest which may be
relied upon by the parties at any time during the proceedings
and must be raised by the Court of Justice on its own motion.256 It therefore held it necessary to consider whether the
contested measure exhibited particularly serious and manifest
defects such as to lead the CFI to declare it non-existent. 257 In
other words, the CFI pursued an active search as regards the
existence of the decision. This action raises some doubts; is it
necessary to search for defects which are so serious and mani258
fest that they lead to non-existence?
In Flat Glass the CFI did not actively carry out a fact-finding investigation. 59 It merely organized, with the parties' consent, a common file in light of which it would examine the
facts. However, the judgment does not indicate which facts
were disputed and which needed to be verified. The text of the
judgment gives the impression that the CFI examined on its
own motion all the facts upon which the Commission relied
253. See J. Mertens de Wilmars; Statement of Reasons and Methods of Interpretationin
the Case Law of the EC Court ofJustice Relating to Articles 85 and 86, in 1987 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 607 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1988) [hereinafter Wilmars].
254. PVC, Joined Cases T-79, 84-86, 89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89,
[1992] E.C.R. -, -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357, 383-85,
66-70 (Ct. First Instance).
255. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 364-65, 7.
256. Id. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 384-85, 68.
257. Id.
258. One may of course consider that the CFI itself was surprised by the result
of its investigation which it carried out to appease the applicants. However, even in
this hypothesis the non-existence of the decision was not manifest but had to be established.
259. See Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/89, [1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. 302 (Ct. First Instance).
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and that the administration should prove before the judges
that it has a case.2 6 Does the CFI see the Commission as the
26
European equivalent of the Federal Trade Commission?
Flat Glass raises another question as regards the assessment of facts. The CFI held that the definition of the relevant
market is a necessary precondition of any judgment concerning allegedly anti-competitive behavior.2 6 2 Is such a definition
a mere matter of fact? In light of the recent Delimitis and Merci
judgments of the Court of Justice, the answer to this question
should be negative.2 63 These cases were referred to the Court
of Justice by national judges pursuant to Article 177.2 4
Although the Court of Justice is not allowed to rule on the
facts in such proceedings, it did give a definition of the relevant market in both cases. The Court of Justice presumably
held that the uniform application of the EC competition rules
depends upon a uniform definition of the relevant market and
that, seen in this way, this definition is indeed a necessary precondition for any judgment on anti-competitive behavior. One
may state that a proper definition of the relevant market constitutes the link between mere facts and pure law and that it
should therefore be given by the Court of Justice or the CFI.
However, in Flat Glass the CFI held that it was not its task to
carry out its own analysis of the market 265 and in Vichy it accepted the market as defined by common consent of the parties.2 6 6 This judicial self restraint contrasts with its active role
on other issues and with the attitude of the Court' of Justice in
Delimitis and Merc.
260. Id. at

-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

-,

160.

261. A more "activist, and so more inquisitorial" approach of the CFI has been
predicted by Temple Lang, supra note 60, at 590. The active attitude of the CFI may
also be compared to the role of the Kammergericht in competition cases under German law; see U. Everling, "Zur richterlichen Kontrolle der Tatsachenfeststellungen
und der Beweiswiirdigung durch die Kommission in Wettbewerbssachen," supra note
251, at 887.
262. Flat Glass, [1992] E.C.R. at

-,

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at

-,

159.

263. Delimitis v. Henninger Briiu AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 935,
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210; Merci v. Bort di Genova, Case C-179/90, (Eur. Ct.J. Dec. 10,
1991) (not yet reported). J. Mertens de Wilmars notes that the Court ofJustice does
not hesitate to complete the facts presented by the national judge in order to render
its interpretation sufficiently concrete. Wilmars, supra note 253, at 611.
264. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 17/7.
265. Flat Glass, [1992] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at -,
160.
266. Vichy, Case T-19/91, slip op. 68 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27, 1992) (not
yet reported).
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B. Procedure
In its case law, the CFI examined the Commission's decisions in the light of several procedural rules and principles.
One of these rules can be found in the Treaty itself-Article
190 concerns the obligation to motivate decisions. 267 This obligation implies that the Commission should state the reasons
upon which its decision is based in order to enable the interested parties to defend their rights and the Courts to exercise
their control. 268 This purely procedural requirement is easily
confounded with issues of substantive law. Advocate General
Vesterdorf expressed this relation as follows: "if a statement of
reasons is based on an incorrect legal view or a wrong assessment of the evidence, this is not therefore a defect in the statement of reasons but, on the contrary, a defect in the' legal and
factual assessment on which the decision in the case is
based. 21 69 In Polypropylene some applicants had confused form
and substance. They argued that the contested decision was
inadequately supported owing to the Commission's failure to
pursue its investigations fully and because it had based its conclusions on insufficient evidence. The CFIrejected this argument by referring to its findings of fact which established that
the Commission had proved its allegations to the requisite
legal standard.
The case law of both the CFI and the Court of Justice
demonstrates that the obligation to state reasons does not
mean that the Commission must deal with all the arguments
raised by the undertakings concerned. 270 However, in Flat
Glass, the CFI held that there is a limit to this rule. It considered that, having regard to the arguments of the parties relating to the analysis of the relevant market, the Commission
ought to have examined more fully the structures and the functioning of the market in order to show why the conclusions
drawn by the applicants were groundless. This means that the
statement of reasons must pay attention to the fundamental ar267. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 190.
268. Compagnia Italiana Alcool S.A.S. v. Commission, Case C-358/90, [1992]
E.C.R.

-,

-

[1992] 2 C.M.L.R. 876, 911 (Ct. First Instance).

269. Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991]
E.C.R.

-,

-,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 125, § I.B.1.

270. See La Cinq SA v. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R.
4 C.M.L.R. 449, 459, 41 (Ct. First Instance).

-,

-,

[1992]
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guments of the undertakings concerned. This raises the question of what should be considered as fundamental. Here again
one gets the impression that the CFI sees itself as the institution which has, under the supervision of the Court of Justice,
the final say in competition matters in which the Commission
acts as an "indirect" prosecutor.
The second source of procedural rules are the regulations
which determine the administrative proceedings before and
within the Commission. As seen above in section IV, the CFI
is not very eager to annul a Commission decision for violation
of the procedural requirements laid down in Regulation 17.271
It prefers to examine whether the breach of procedural requirements affected the substance of the case; in that sense it
will annul only if, without this breach, the final outcome of the
decision would have been different. PVC is an exception to
this substantive approach.2 7 2
Both sets of procedural rules have been specified and
completed in HauptzollamtMiinchen-Mitte v. Technische Universitdt
Minchen in which the Court of Justice held that, in cases where
the Community has a discretionary competence, observance of
procedural guarantees assumes an even more fundamental importance.2 73 These guarantees relate, in particular, to the obligation of the competent institution to examine, with diligence
and impartiality, all relevant elements of the case, the right of
the interested person to express his point of view and the obligation to state adequate reasons for the decision. The CFI has
referred to this judgment in PVC, La Cinq, and Danish Furs.2 74
In Danish Furs, the CFI held that the statement of reasons
should be contained in the decision itself and that it cannot be
supplemented during the proceedings before the court. PVC
concerned a similar specification of Article 190.275 The CFI
held that any administrative procedure for drawing up and
271. See RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. ,[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First
Instance); Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84 (Ct. First
Instance).
272. PVC, Joined Cases T-79, 84-86, 89, 91-92, 94, 96, 98, 102 & 104/89,
[1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357 (Ct. First Instance).
273. Case C-269/90 (Eur. Ct. J. Nov. 21, 1991) (not yet reported).
274. See PVC, [1992] E.C.R. -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357; La Cinq SA v. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 449 (Ct. First Instance);
Danish Furs, Case T-61/89, (Ct. First Instance July 3, 1992) (not yet reported).
275. PVC, [1992] E.C.R. _, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 357.
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adopting measures which allows subsequent amendments to
be made to the statement of reasons is directly contrary to the
fundamental procedural guarantees mentioned in Technische
Universitdt Minchen.2 76 It subsequently considered that this
principle underlined the importance of Article 12 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure.2 77 Does this mean that the CFI
sees Article 12 as a further implementation of Article 190? If
this is correct, the violation of Article 12 constitutes a breach
of an essential procedural requirement and not a factor which
leads to non-existence of the measure concerned.
In La Cinq, the CFI referred to Technische Universitdt
Mtinchen as regards the principle of administrative diligence
and impartiality. 278 The Commission had not respected this
principle, because it had failed to take due account of all relevant facts and circumstances. If one compares this outcome
with Flat Glass, the principle of administrative diligence may
overlap the obligation to state reasons; fundamental arguments and elements must be discussed in the statement of reasons. However, the principle has wider implications. It not
only implies that the administration should examine all the relevant facts, but also that this examination is carried out in a
proper way and takes account of the observations put forward
by the interested parties.279
C. Legal Appraisal
According to the standard formula of the Court of Justice
in Remia, judicial review of the Commission's legal assessment
is limited to examining whether the conditions for the application of Articles 85 and 86 are fulfilled and whether the Commission has made a manifest error ofjudgment or has misused
its powers.2 8 0 As regards the conditions for the application of
both Articles, the administration does not have any discretionary power; the law should be correctly applied. However, the
276. Id. at _,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 386.

277. CFI Rules of Procedure, supra note 16, art. 12, O.J. L 136/1, at 5 (1991).
278. La Cinq, [1992] E.C.R. at

-,

[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 468.

279. See Detlef N61le, Case C-16/90, (Eur. Ct. J. Oct. 22, 1991) (not yet reported), in which the Court of Justice declared an antidumping regulation invalid
because the Commission had not respected the principle of administrative diligence.
280. Remia BV v. Commission, Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1
C.M.L.R. 1.
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main legal issue in competition cases does not, in most cases,
relate to the interpretation of legal concepts, but to the qualification of facts in light of these concepts. The case law of the
CFI illustrates that it is more tolerant with the Commission as
regards this qualification issue.2 8 ' In Polypropylene, the CFI
even allowed the Commission to qualify the facts as both an
agreement and a concerted practice, because they constituted
a complex whole for which Article 85(1) does not lay down
specific categories.28 2
Qualification problems do not only relate to issues of substantive law, but also to the choice of procedures; was the
Commission entitled to use a particular procedure or to exercise a particular type of competence in the specific circumstances of the case? Two cases, Vichy and La Cinq, seem to reflect the CFI's attitude towards this question. In Vichy, the CFI
approved the Commission's choice to act under Article 15(6)
even if Vichy's notifications could not exactly be qualified as
delaying tactics in a field where the law as regards selective distribution in pharmacies was clearly established.2 83 This rather
generous attitude is confirmed by La Cinq, in which the CFI
considered that the Commission's interpretation of its powers
to grant interim relief was too narrow.28 4 However, the ruling
in La Cinq could also be seen as an obligation for the Commission to grant such relief when it receives a serious complaint.
Within the limits of its substantive and procedural powers
the Commission enjoys a considerable discretion.2 8 5 In
Polypropylene, the CFI introduced a new criterion to control the
way in which this discretionary power is exercised in the field
of competition. Official publications and declarations bind the
281. See in particular Peugeot with respect to Ecosystem's position as intermediary and RTE as regards the qualifications of the refusal to license as an abuse.
Peugeot, Case T-23/90R, [1990] E.C.R. 11-195, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 674 (Ct. First Instance); RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. _, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance).
282. Hercules, Case T-7/89, [1991] E.C.R. -, - [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 84, 312-13,
262-63 (Ct. First Instance); ICI, Case T-13/89, slip op.
259-60 (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Shell, Case T-I 1/89, slip op.
305 (Ct.
i
First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported).
283. Vichy, Case' T-19/91 (Ct. First Instance Feb. 27, 1992) (not yet reported).
284. La Cinq SA v. Commission, Case T-44/90, [1992] E.C.R. -, - [1992] 4
C.M.L.R. 449, 467-68 (Ct. First Instance).
285. The Court of Justice applies more principles than the ones mentioned
here. See Everling, supra note 251, at 882-83.
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Commission in as much as it cannot depart from rules which it
has imposed on itself. This version of the estoppel principle
enhances the importance of the Commission's policy statements. It remains unclear which formal requirements have to
be met in this respect; e.g., where should these statements be
published? Polypropylene concerned a publication in an annual
Competition Report.286 It should therefore be supposed that notices published in the OfficialJournalhave an even more important binding effect. However, this effect seems to be limited to
policy statements of a general nature. The CFI does not attach
a binding force to the application of competition rules in individual cases. In Polypropylene, the CFI considered that the criteria upon which the Commission relied for the imposition of
fines in one case was not binding as regards the assessment of
the level of fines in another case.28 7
Finally, mention should be made of the unlimited jurisdiction which the CFI exercises, pursuant to Article 172 of the
EEC Treaty, in regard to fines imposed by the Commission.28 8
This jurisdiction does not allow the CFI to pursue its own fining policy, but gives it the possibility to substitute its own assessment for that of the Commission in individual cases.28 9 As
seen in Polypropylene and Flat Glass, the need for this kind of
jurisdiction arises in particular when a Commission decision is
partially annulled. Without unlimited jurisdiction, the consequence of such annulment would be that all the fines would be
illegally imposed because the Commission calculated them on
the basis of the infringement in its entirety. In Flat Glass and
Polypropylene the CFI exercised its unlimited jurisdiction to reassess the level of fines to what was considered to be adequate
in light of those parts of the infringement which passed the test
290
of the CFI's control.

However, unlimited jurisdiction can also go further, when
286. See, e.g., Hercules, [1991] E.C.R. at -, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 265-66, 53.
287. ICI, Case T-13/89, slip op.
322-95 (discussing the fine) (Ct. First Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported).
288. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 172.
289. See Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Hercules, [1992] E.C.R. at __
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at _, § III.A. Sir Gordon Slynn considers that Article 172 allows
the Court of Justice to increase the amount of fines. Slynn, supra note 251.
290. See ICI, slip op.
394; Shell, Case T-11/89, slip op.
371 (Ct. First
Instance Mar. 10, 1992) (not yet reported); Flat Glass, Joined Cases T-68, 77 & 78/
89, [1992] E.C.R.

-,

-

[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302,

_,

374 (Ct. First Instance).
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an applicant specifically challenges an element of the Commission's calculation of fines. In light of such an application, the
CFI must examine whether the Commission made a manifest
error on that point. In Polypropylene the CFI held that such an
error was made as regards the cooperative attitude of ICI during the administrative proceedings before the Commission.2 9 1
FINAL REMARKS
During its first three years (cut-off date June 30, 1992) the
CFI has rendered thirty-two judgments in competition cases.
This is a considerable amount for a newly created jurisdiction
that had to set up its registry, determine its working methods
and adopt its Rules of Procedure. It should also be noted that
its judgments in Polypropylene, Flat Glass and PVC concerned
complicated and voluminous cases. These efforts should be
applauded as they certainly contributed in alleviating the workload of the Court ofJustice. Without a transfer of competence
in competition cases, the back-log at the Court ofJustice would
have been even more disquieting and Polypropylene, Flat Glass,
and PVC might still be undecided.
However, some criticism cannot be excluded. First, many
of the cases transferred by the Court of Justice to the CFI are
still waiting for a judgment. Second, the CFI is supposed to be
a specialized jurisdiction. Seen from this angle, its production
of thirty-two judgments is relatively disappointing if one makes
a comparison with the fourteen judgments rendered by the
Court of Justice during the same period, especially since the
Court of Justice had to deal with many other cases as well.
Third, the Court ofJustice has not yet ruled in appeal cases. It
might well be that the number of appeals will increase its workload.
As regards the qualitative objective pursued by the Council in its decision of October 24, 1988, the establishment of the
CFI has undoubtedly been a success. Its review of complex
factual matters is exhaustive and one may even wonder
whether the CFI is not too zealous in this respect. If its active
inquisitorial attitude in some cases becomes the future norm
for its judicial control, the nature of competition proceedings
291. ICI, slip op.

394.
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will change. The center of gravity will shift from the procedure
before the Commission to the procedure before the CFI.
However, a new transfer of competence to the CFI may be expected in the near future and will probably increase the pressure upon the CFI's resources. Then, there will be no time for
new adventures on the path of judicial control.

